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 Nathanael West‟s tragically brief creative career was intensely concerned with the 
anomie of modern society, especially in the landscape of twentieth-century America.  For West, 
this landscape is one populated by the disintegration of traditional community and the 
interrogation of values once posited as unassailable.  As such, conventional West criticism has 
read the author as an intractable nihilist.  Within the last decade, however, West criticism has 
taken an entirely new approach.  Critics like Jonathan Greenberg and Justus Nieland have 
attempted to erect an ethical West by placing him within the discourse of modernist 
antisentimentalism.  It is within this critical reevaluation of West that I would like to place my 
argument.  When we are first introduced to the title character of West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts, we 
find the advice columnist incapable of offering another hackneyed response to his suffering 
readership, which is a refusal that places him on the road to what we might call a sincere ethical 
response that seeks an appropriate message of hope and healing.  As we see, though, Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical journey is fraught with peril: he must constantly battle with the rhetoric of 
the newspaper column‟s sentimentalism, a morally bankrupt culture that degrades his desire for 
sincerity, and the dangers of egotistical pride.  Indeed, he presumably dies unable to realize his 
ethical responsibility.  Nonetheless, I locate within this ostensibly meaningless death and within 
the text the potential of a radical reassessment of ethics that anticipates the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas.  For Levinas, ethical traumatism commands a supererogatory giving out of the subject, 
who has no available means of what constitutes an appropriate moral response.  Using the ethical 
philosophy of Levinas, I perform a close reading of the novel that finds a West who presents 
ethical responsibility as a trauma that obligates the subject to a moral duty it can neither fulfill 
nor defer.  We see, then, that the ethical moment in West comes not in normative ethical action, 
but instead, comes in the traumatic moments of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “writer‟s block,” when 
language and cognition break down, and Miss Lonelyhearts has absolutely no idea how to 






















Soldiers!  Don‟t give yourselves to these brutes – who despise you – enslave you – who 
regiment your lives – tell you what to do – what to think and what to feel!  Who drill you – diet 
you – treat you like cattle and use you as cannon fodder.  Don‟t give yourselves to these 
unnatural men – machine men with machine minds and machine hearts!  You are not machines!  
You are men! 
 
         – Charlie Chaplin 
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In William March‟s Company K (1933) – a novel composed as a series of vignettes, each 
depicting the perspective of an individual American soldier or officer as he tries to make sense 
out of events either before World War I or upon the battlefield – there is a particularly revealing 
sketch that gives insight into what Western societies had introduced to them there on the shell-
scorched fields of France.
1
  As Private Charles Gordon stands looking at the group of captured 
enemy soldiers he and his company have marched to an isolated ravine, he makes eye contact 
with one of the men – a German with blue eyes.  The blue-eyed man looks at Gordon and smiles; 
Gordon involuntarily smiles right back in what seems an essentially natural reaction of 
fellowship.  And as the company sergeant gives the firing commands, and as Gordon takes 
“steady aim at the blue-eyed man,” whatever sense of fellowship these two soldiers may have 
felt immediately reveals itself as false and illusory.  “For some reason,” states Gordon, “I wanted 
him to be killed instantly.”  Perhaps the young private feels compassion towards this German, 
this stranger, and as such, desires that he die a quick and relatively painless death.  But as 
Gordon continues to stand and fire upon the man, watching him writhe in agony and listening to 
his horrible moans that seem to be taunting Gordon‟s compassion and thwarting his effort at 
mercy, the real irony of this war is shown to the American doughboy: “ „Everything I was ever 
taught to believe about mercy, justice and virtue is a lie,‟….  „But the biggest lie of all are the 
words “God is Love.”  That is really the most terrible lie that man ever thought of‟ ” (86).  How 
much pain, Gordon asks, can a loving God allow human individuals to endure? 
                                                 
1
 William March had himself served as a soldier during the American war effort in WWI, and many of the tales in 
Company K are based on his own experiences. 
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 For Europe and America, World War I marked the sense of a great historical loss, not just 
in the unprecedented amounts of young men wasted upon the field of battle, but in the cultural 
values composing a mythos that had sustained the Western imagination and sense of identity for 
centuries.  Indeed, the prewar period was one that still relatively retained the continuity of a 
Western ethos predicated upon cultural ideals that were essentially viewed as real and palpable 
rather than as the abstractions that various circles within the Western intelligentsia claimed them 
to be.  As Paul Fussell claims in The Great War and Modern Memory, “[T]he Great War took 
place in what was, compared with ours, a static world, where the values appeared stable and 
where the meanings of abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.  Everyone knew what Glory 
was, and what Honor meant” (21).  For Fussell, as it is for March, the experience of the war is 
indelibly the experience of modern irony par excellence: “Out of the world of summer, 1914, 
marched a unique generation.  It believed in Progress and Art and in no way doubted the 
benignity even of technology.  The word machine was not yet invariably coupled with the word 
gun” (24).  According to Fussell, WWI was to be the last war that took place within a world 
seemingly guided by a purposeful history that did not lack, as of yet, a narrative coherence (21).  
This coherence negotiated a rational human telos and historical destiny, while it also guaranteed 
the legitimation and meaning of warfare and human suffering as necessities toward the ultimate 
fulfillment of the rational, utopian end.  WWI, then, was the beginning of an alternative 
historical narrative marked not by progress and rational necessity (such as in Hegelian 
dialecticism) but by absence – that is, modern history began to be looked at by several thinkers 
and artists as completely devoid of the presence of value and destiny. 
 It was not until 1945, however, when this questioning of both Enlightenment ideals and 
of a world grounded in a faith in deity, would come to a head.  In that year, modernity and 
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rationalism asserted themselves in horrific ways previously unimagined, of which the Great War 
was just a glimpse.  The Holocaust marks the ultimate (and untimely) point of modernity‟s full 
self-reflexivity – the event that guaranteed and solidified the completion of the epoch‟s coming-
into-awareness.  The mass murder of six million Jewish men, women, and children can be 
viewed as the event that finally answered the questions posed by places like Marne, Verdun, and 
the Somme, and that answer was found in what several thinkers viewed as the absolute loss of 
intrinsic value and meaning in human history.
2
  Post-Holocaust Jewish philosopher, Emil L. 
Fackenheim, states that the Holocaust is “an event that called into question all things – God, 
man, the ancient revelation and the modern secular self-confidence, philosophic thought and 
indeed any kind of thought” (9).  For Fackenheim, the Holocaust is the West‟s final reckoning 
with Enlightenment.  Kant, that inimitable proponent of reason and hope,
3
 possesses a faith in 
humankind; he maintains the existence of a good will present in every human being even if often 
overshadowed by moral degradation.  This “Idea of Humanity,” as Fackenheim describes it, 
experiences a crisis at the hands of the Nazi Aryan ideal: 
Kant, in short, believes in humanity: but is that belief warranted? Perhaps it was 
so in Kant‟s time.  Arguably it was once warranted at any time if only because, 
while undemonstrable, this belief was at least also irrefutable….  It is true that 
Kant‟s belief in humanity could at not time be verified.  However, not until the 
advent of the Holocaust world was this belief refuted, for here the reality that is 
                                                 
2
 An entire generation of post-Holocaust Jewish thinkers has attempted to come to terms with what this event means 
to both the Jewish people and to modernity.  For Richard Rubenstein, the traditional notion of God is no longer 
possible after an experience like Auschwitz.  For Eliezer Berkovits, the Holocaust represents the ultimate demise of 
Western, specifically Christian, religious and moral culture (Haas 219-21). 
3
 Already, in Kant, is the awareness of the possibility of historical absence; however, Kant professes that the 
individual must retain hope in the meaning of his or her existence.  This alone, for Kant, makes life inherently 
meaningful and purposeful.  We must hope because we don‟t know, and in this hoping, life becomes valuable. 
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object of the belief was itself systematically annihilated.  That this was possible is 
the awful legacy of Auschwitz to all humanity.  The awful legacy for philosophy 
is that the annihilation of human personality robs the Idea of Humanity of its 
indispensable basis. (273) 
The Holocaust scoffs at Kant‟s ideal of a virtuous human community and a cosmopolitan ethics.  
That seemingly “good” human beings could participate in such horrific acts of violence toward 
others, with apparently good conscience – believing this violence a service to the State, or to das 
Volk, or, most bizarrely, even to humanity – seems to rob such notions as History, Freedom, and 
the Human of their value and worth.  “Auschwitz,” states Fackenheim, “does not paralyze this or 
that philosophical thought but the whole metaphysical capacity” (276).  The Holocaust 
challenges – indeed, “paralyzes” – the metaphysics of Humanity.  God and the Human are called 
into question, and along with them, the traditional systems of ethical thought and moral action.  
For certain individuals and intellectual circles, this means that no longer is there confidence in a 
morality of deity or a morality predicated upon the “unassailable” soundness of human reason.   
Framed by the horrific memory of the Great War and the looming specter of the Second 
World War, the interwar period is characterized by an ethical despondency that shaped not only 
philosophy but also the creative work of an entire generation of authors.  The modernist writers 
of the Lost Generation demonstrate, within their works, disillusionment with conventional 
cultural values and the traditional social structure.  As such, one of the central dilemmas that 
defines modernism is the precarious attempt to resurrect an ethical meaning and moral 
sustenance for the contemporary West.  Fully cognizant of this dilemma, Nathanael West‟s Miss 
Lonelyhearts, then, traces a coming-into-awareness of modernity, articulating the twentieth-
century‟s crisis of ethics, both in reaction to the Great War and in anticipation of the Nazi death 
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camps.  What West‟s fictional work depicts is a modernity in turmoil as all versions of ameliorist 
history collapse into disrepair and all versions of conventional ethics – whether originating in 
God or in Reason – irrevocably fall prey to the censure of modern skepticism.  Lacking the sense 
that neither the suffering of his correspondents is justifiable nor human life meaningful, Miss 
Lonelyhearts searches for a moral solution adequate to the task of redeeming human suffering – 
a response that will place this suffering within a historical narrative of sense and value.  Against 
a twentieth-century that increasingly problematizes deity, Miss Lonelyhearts attempts to cling to 
a mythic imagination, as suggested by his Christian ideal, assuming the role of Christ in his quest 
to alleviate the pain of others and bestow purpose upon individual lives.  But this attempt at a 
Christian moral response, professing value in such things as love, fellowship, and self-sacrifice, 
reveals itself as intransigently troubled and horribly inept in the novel; Miss Lonelyhearts‟ world 
is one that seems to refuse any attempts at purpose and to preclude any attempts at legitimating 
the suffering of individuals.  This suffering world reveals itself as stubbornly nonsensical, thus 
claiming to parallel our own.  In this sense, Miss Lonelyhearts is to be read as an interrogation of 
the value of ethical response in a modern era where moral language no longer seems to make any 
sense, where the belief of historical agency seems a punching-dummy and communal sharing 
nothing but mere nostalgia. 
 Indeed, Miss Lonelyhearts presents us with such an inexorable challenge to the 
possibility of restoring ethical meaning that conventional West criticism has cited the author as 
obdurately unwilling to proclaim a viable approach to modernism‟s moral dilemma.  For Mike 
Frank in “The Passion of Miss Lonelyhearts According to Nathanael West,” the novel‟s 
dominant theme is none other than futility itself as well as the “rage that must follow from that 
futility if one begins by assuming that solutions are not only necessary but possible” (70).  As 
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Frank claims, the Christian myth, projected forth in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-complex,
4
 no 
longer possesses any viability for modernity; rather, the only myth that applies to the 
contemporary world is the myth of the wasteland: 
Instead, West implies, the applicable myth is that of the wasteland, and, in fact, 
the wasteland myth made even more hopeless, for in West‟s version the death of 
the scapegoat presages no redemption whatsoever.  West sees the world as a 
perennial wasteland in which heroism is meaningless and martyrdom futile.  The 
only way to go on in such a world is to be blind to the true nature of things and to 
persist in a delusory faith.  Thus Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents are in a real 
sense better off than he is, for they, at least, can believe in him. (73) 
Such a reading, then, suggests that West negates the prospect of recovering either a sense of 
existential value or even a hint of ethical meaning.  The world, as defined by West, simply is, 
and it exists as such without substance and coherence.  Frank continues by claiming that “the 
only reasonable alternative to the protagonist‟s furious despair,” to a world that resists value, “is 
cynicism, and Shrike‟s responses, repulsive though they may be, at least have the virtue of 
making sense, of being adequate to the stimuli” (69).  The only other option, Frank posits, is that 
of a despair that ends in early death, as in the case of Miss Lonelyhearts (73).  Thus, he 
concludes, West resists offering any sort of ethical consolation to his contemporaries. 
 Frank is certainly not alone in his reading of a nihilistic West.  In “The Art of Significant 
Disorder: The Fiction of Nathanael West,” Jan Gorak places Miss Lonelyhearts within a broader 
modernist schema of the artist as “godly maker”; however, rather than playing the part of the 
                                                 
4
 Frank sees Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-complex as not only a response to the human suffering that he thinks Christ 
was to have ended but also as a biting, vitriolic commentary upon “the efficacy of Christ‟s passion” (70). 
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hero who is capable of offering a path out of the current social malaise, Miss Lonelyhearts only 
constructs a world of illusions, of false realities that offer no legitimate significance to human 
life (185-87).  Similarly, according to Nancy Walker Hand in “A Novel in the Form of a Comic 
Strip: Nathanael West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts,” West exposes the business of dreams – that is, the 
desire to restore significance to life – as nothing but dangerous fancy.  “[D]reams are dangerous 
delusions,” she states, “dangerous because they lead men to believe in solutions to their 
problems, in the possibility of order; delusions because order and solutions do not exist, and false 
hope makes reality even harsher by contrast” (15).
5
  Furthermore, in Nathanael West: An 
Interpretative Study, James F. Light thinks that we are to perceive Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death as 
ultimately meaningless (100).  Miss Lonelyhearts, enraptured by the prospect of being able to 
perform a miracle in order to demonstrate his faith, misreads Peter Doyle‟s scream, believing it 
to be the pleas for help of all his correspondents.  Rather than pleading for help, though, Doyle 
presumably shoots and kills Miss Lonelyhearts instead.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ untimely demise, 
then, would seem to negate, according to Light, any sort of redemptive power – he simply dies, 
and that is that.
6
 
                                                 
5
 Hand notes that the theme of disorder is even evident in the novel‟s stylistic structure: 
The abrupt changes of scene, the introduction of characters at seemingly random points, and the 
patterns of anticlimactic events and ironies create an impression of disorder, of chaos and 
unpredictability, which reflects West‟s view of man‟s life. (14) 
6
 In his study, Light also discusses the youthful West, as a student at Brown University during the 1920s.  As Light 
uses these revelations of the younger West, we are meant to see the roots of the author‟s potentially (un)ethical 
stance.  “As a youth who had read Nietzsche and Flaubert, Dostoevsky and Baudelaire,” Light states, “he was aware 
of his difference from ordinary humankind, and he was susceptible to certain ideas about the superman, above 
ordinary codes and laws” (31).  More significantly, Light recasts John Sanford‟s (a friend of West‟s during the 
writer‟s Brown days) account of West‟s apparent enthusiastic support for Baudelaire‟s trenchant retort to a poor 
beggar, who had accosted the Frenchman for money.  “Apparently West approved the action of Baudelaire,” Light 
claims, “and for Sanford the approval indicated West‟s lack of love for the weak and helpless, his receptivity to 
Nietzschean ideas” (31).  Further, Light continues by writing that “[t]hese superman concepts he would have to 
struggle with and conquer before he was fully human, but in college the ideas were attractive” (31). 
 While both Light and Sanford may be correct in their interpretation of West‟s actions here in response to 
Baudelaire, they fail to take into account the significance of Baudelaire‟s rejection.  His rejection of the beggar was 
not necessarily a rejection of ethical responsibility (though one certainly could read it this way), but more 
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 While it is admittedly easy to read the death of Miss Lonelyhearts as meaningless and 
insignificant, this death betrays, nonetheless, an awareness of the confusion entailed by ethics.  
Miss Lonelyhearts is one confused man, and his death is no less confusing.  In its morbid 
relationship to his failed ethical responsibility, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death scene signals a 
conceptualization of ethics that is supererogatory and beyond apprehension.  Miss Lonelyhearts 
remains unable to ever fulfill his ethical duty and obligation unto the other.  That he is killed by 
the one whom he wishes to help indicates that, for West, we can never be assured of either our 
ethical capacities or of our fulfillment of ethical responsibility.  Rather than being insignificant, 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death gestures at the real demands of ethics, which is a traumatizing 
experience that takes the subject out of any sense of familiarity and moral coherence.  Although 
the death of Miss Lonelyhearts, as well as the novel itself, is a confrontation with nihilism, we 
are not necessarily meant to read it or West as nihilistic.  In this sense, I would like to suggest 
that in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ confrontation with despair, we find in its apparently bleak conclusions 
the foundations of an authentic ethics that doesn‟t correspond with the conventional morality that 
West criticizes.  Positing ethical experience as trauma and morality as not just duty but also a 
foundation of being,West becomes vastly relevant to current philosophical thought, sharing 
ethical values with those of Emmanuel Levinas. 
In the preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas states, “Everyone will readily agree that it 
is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality” (21).  Like West, 
Levinas asks if we are only deceiving ourselves when we speak of such things as ethics and 
moral action, and also like West, Levinas writes during a century of unimagined atrocity and 
                                                                                                                                                             
importantly, was a rejection of bourgeois morality, particularly bourgeois sentimentality.  I will have much more to 
say about West‟s relationship with the discourse of ethical sentimentalism, especially the popular versions of mass 
culture sentimentalism, below. 
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violence.  For Levinas, the question of ethics is one that must be approached through a 
recognition of the tendency of traditional systems of moral thought to generalize and abstract the 
site of ethical interaction.  Conventional ethics are, for the French philosopher, marked by 
sameness, relationality, and dependence – all of which consume both the autonomy and the 
integrity of the other into the same (i.e., generalize the other‟s particularity).  As Levinas claims, 
the other stands apart from any idea or concept that the self may have for approaching him or 
her.  Rather, the particularity of the other expresses beyond form, beyond intelligence – the other 
is the absolute particular.  For this reason, any ethical scheme that generalizes the other is, in 
Levinas, a violence committed against him or her.  The particularity of the other is what gives us 
the human and gives us the ethical relationship.  Positing an ethics of difference, Levinas argues 
for the radical particularity of the self and of the other, neither of which maintains an ethical 
relation with another that can be generalized through language and thought.  The other is a 
stranger, completely separate in its existence, and not – as a conventional ethics of reason would 
have it, according to Levinas – an extension of the self.  Because the other maintains the integrity 
of its existence, the other also calls into question the self‟s freedom,
7
 commanding the self to act 
in response to its suffering, but more specifically, in response to its position as master.  The face 
of the other, as master, commands ethical response out of the self, but at the same time, requires 
the recognition of the face‟s otherness – that is, requires the particularity of response instead of a 
universalist agenda.  In response to the other, Levinas claims, the self must not resort to an ethics 
of sameness but, rather, must embrace an ethics of difference that respects the alterity of the 
                                                 
7
 Levinas‟s philosophy is admittedly fraught with ambiguity and seeming inconsistency.  The issues of agency and 
necessity do not typically concern Levinas; rather, freedom – in the sense of the subject‟s separation – and its 
interrogation by the other take precedence in Levinasian thought.  The self, according to Levinas, is both separate 
from and obligated to the other.  While the self maintains its autonomy, it is also, ironically, called into question by 
the other.  Thus, for Levinas, not only is ethics a site of difference but subjectivity itself is also viewed as difference. 
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other.  Real ethical interaction does not begin until the self comes to a recognition of its 
responsibility and obligation toward the other, both of which impose unbearable, supererogatory 
demands.  This responsibility and obligation toward the other – this justice, as Levinas deems it – 
make claims upon the self that go far beyond what the self is actually capable of delivering, and 
in this sense, ethics becomes a site of continuous trauma.
8
   
 As I argue in this paper, both West and Levinas are to be read as attempting to negotiate 
an ethics appropriate to modernity, an ethics located outside of traditional systems of 
philosophical thought and non-reducible to sameness.  West‟s fiction has most often been 
received by critics as a nihilistic disavowal of moral action and value.  These critics have tended 
to view Miss Lonelyhearts, specifically, as West‟s gesture at the essential demise of any sort of 
authentic ethical response after modernity (if indeed, there were ever an authenticity in ethics at 
all).  Reading Miss Lonelyhearts, however, in the light of Levinasian ethical philosophy, reveals 
what I claim to be a vastly different West, as both artist and thinker, from what critics have 
imagined.  In West, as I will argue, ethics is still a possibility but one which must be radically 
reconfigured and persistently interrogated.  West‟s ethical response, then, like Levinas‟s, can be 
characterized as an experience of trauma that makes continuous and unbearable claims upon the 
                                                 
8
 Levinas posits subjectivity as a pre-ontological traumatism.  The other is always already present in the self‟s 
existence, making claims upon the self even before the self is able to respond in any sort of capacity at all.  (For 
more about the pre-ontological, see pages 41-44.)  As such, ethical interaction becomes the experience of this 
primordial trauma.  The face of the other always commands a response from the self that is above and beyond what 
the self is ever actually capable of delivering. 
 Interestingly, in Vigilant Memory: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust, and the Unjust Death, R. Clifton 
Spargo traces what can be characterized as Levinas‟s language of traumatism to the Jewish philosopher‟s continued 
reckoning with the Holocaust.  Spargo argues that Levinas employs a “strategy of referring to the Holocaust by 
rhetorical indirection, through figures of rupture and unpleasure” (24).  Levinas‟s unwillingness to directly speak 
about the Holocaust in his works is a product of both his nonhistoricist method and “his respect for the victims who 
have been silenced and should not be presumptively ventriloquized” (24).  Spargo continues by claiming that, in 
Levinas, “[t]o the extent that the Holocaust is invoked as a superfluous sign of injustice, it characterizes the 
precariousness of ethics within philosophy as though ethics must run parallel hereafter to the political questions 
raised by post-1945 memory” (24). 
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self.  For West, the self is constantly called into question by the other who commands the self to 
ethical response.  As I argue here, West posits a new ethics of difference and traumatism that not 
only anticipates the thought of Levinas but also anticipates the shift in late twentieth-century 



































                                                 
9
 Levinas is not alone among mid- to late twentieth-century thinkers shifting their philosophies towards the 
centrality of the other rather than the self.  Lacan‟s psychoanalytic ethics posits the other‟s primacy in the ego, while 
the tradition of Deconstructive ethics, beginning in Derrida, also places primacy upon the other. 
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II. MODERNITY AND THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY 
 
Modernity, quite simply, is an age of irony.  On the one hand, it is a history that traces 
humankind‟s fervent emphasis upon the individual, society, reason, and progress (not to mention 
another modernity that also finds value in deity and religious faith).  Enlightenment humanism 
professed a profound faith in the subject‟s agency, and its political theory generally endorsed 
democratic social institutions, while the foundation of Enlightenment thought was a belief in the 
possibility of truth and knowing.  However, on the other hand, the Enlightenment is haunted by a 
history that follows humanity‟s increasing doubt and skepticism over knowledge and certainty; 
this was the modernity marked by Nietzsche‟s “death of God,” the alienation of the individual, 
and the collapse of traditional forms of identification and community.  For this discussion, the 
latter history becomes particularly crucial in examining the sociophilosophical milieu inherited 
by both West and Levinas.
10
  The enervation of traditional forms of communal identification in 
modernity, with its weakening of the social structures that allow for consensus, creates a site in 
which numerous individuals find themselves both disenfranchised from a social whole and 
lacking in a coherent belief structure.  Aware of the troubled relationship between community 
and individual that modernity entails, West and Levinas seek approaches to ethics that do not 
necessarily depend upon the unification of a social structure.   
In this chapter, I will explore the dialectic between community and individual as it exists 
according to modern skepticism and nihilism.  Closely examining Nietzsche‟s understanding of 
modernity, I hope to demonstrate how, for the German philosopher, the mythic capacity of the 
                                                 
10
 I should go ahead and acknowledge here that West and Levinas do not share similar ideas concerning religion.  
While West was a non-practicing Jew, Levinas still placed much stock in his Judaism.  In fact, Levinas‟s theology 
plays a significant role in informing his ethical philosophy.  It is important to realize, however, that both authors are 
keenly aware that they inherit a modernity that questions the possibility of grounding ethical action and thought in 
such values as deity and reason, and, as such, they both search for viable alternatives. 
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communal structure no longer holds absolute power in determining individuals‟ social 
identifications and values.  This conversation, as I will later claim, is essential for understanding 
why West and Levinas reject the attempt, on the part of some, to resurrect traditional community 
in an effort to restore its “mythic” value. 
 
As I imply above, “modernity” is a vastly relative term; however, the modernity that currently 
concerns us the most is that which questions the coherence of both Enlightenment values and 
systems of religious belief.  This metaphysico-epistemological doubt finds some of its most 
substantial advocacy in the thought of Nietzsche, where the entirety of the Western metaphysical 
tradition is thrown into the flames of inquisition.  Truth, according to Nietzsche, is an 
anthropomorphism – that is, truth is “made” by human beings rather than an Absolute existing 
apart from human actions.  In an early essay, entitled “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 
Nietzsche posits truth and knowing not as present, stable matters available to human beings for 
access, but, instead, as radically contingent and mere linguistic play.  “What then is truth?” he 
asks, “A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of 
human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and 
embellished” (112).  Thus, for Nietzsche, truth and knowing are by necessity themselves 
illusory: “Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” (112).  This attack upon 
metaphysics and logos launches an assault against what Derrida has characterized as the 
metaphysics of presence.  What begins with Nietzsche, then, is a tradition of modern thought that 
posits both truth and history as absence and lack rather than presence and destiny; with Nietzsche 
is the advent of an intense philosophical skepticism that holds the Archimedean point of Western 
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metaphysics under harsh scrutiny.  And this “point,” this presence, is to be traced, according to 
Nietzsche, to the very mythological capacity of human beings and culture. 
The mythologizing force in human intellect is what, for Nietzsche, serves as the 
provenance of culture and truth.  Mythos serves as a way of binding together people into a 
community of shared belief and value.  According to David Owen in Maturity and Modernity: 
Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason, the mythological capacity, in 
Nietzsche‟s formulation, serves two predominant uses.  “Firstly,” Owen states, “it functions as a 
system of explanation which legitimates the customs constitutive of a culture….  Secondly, myth 
in its festive embodiment provides a channel through which the communal re-affirmation of a 
culture is articulated” (43-44).  One might say, then, that the ability to narrate is also the ability 
to “narrate,” or form, a culture; myth becomes the route by which a community is capable of 
constructing itself, its values, its beliefs, and its truths.  As long as the desire for this 
mythological force is present in human culture, then, according to Nietzsche, individuals are 
viewed as an intrinsic part of their communities, and the value of each individual – that is, their 
social significance as well as their belief in their own personal significance – is determined and 
upheld by the communal whole.  
Modernity, however, marks the questioning of the mythological capacity of culture, 
thereby disrupting both historical continuity and the processes of communal identification.  The 
outcome of this enervation of mythic value is found in what Nietzsche describes as modern 
nihilism – the disavowal of truth and value after the “death of God.”
11
  For Nietzsche, modern 
secularist culture has brought about the “death of God,” meaning that, in this formulation, no 
                                                 
11
 Nietzsche‟s thought held currency, primarily, for some individuals in the artistic avant-garde and the intelligentsia 
at different times throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Most people, however, were 
obviously not Nietzscheans, nor did they share analagous sensibilities or ideas concerning tradition, community, and 
value. 
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longer are Western cultures and individuals able to legitimate belief and value through an appeal 
to deity (as they had in what Nietzsche essentially constructs as the Christian past); similarly, 
Nietzsche thinks we now no longer have an appeal to divinity (not that we ever did, he claims) in 
order to make sense out of existence and individual lives.  Modern nihilism posits that no value 
is present in life, and therefore, life and the actions of human agents are (ultimately) 
meaningless.  According to Owen, “Nihilism emerges in that moment in which the will to truth 
abolishes the ground of its own value and becomes conscious of itself as a problem” (59).  The 
will to truth, for Nietzsche, incites the mythic imagination, and thus, once this will abolishes 
itself, myth also loses its substance, thereby negating both the community and the individual as 
transcendental values.  While Nietzsche praises what he understands as modernity‟s loss of value 
in a Christian mythos, he, nonetheless, acknowledges the need for myth in individual lives and 
cultures so as to avoid the negating, nihilistic tendency of modernity.  “Within prehistory,” 
argues Owen, “the individual‟s goals were determined by the customs constitutive of the 
community.  The moment of history, however, signals the overcoming of the morality of 
custom,” indicating the necessity of “an alternative source of goals” as well as implying “the 
possibility of the individuals determining their own goals” (40).   
In other words, the loss of communal value within modernity necessitates, for Nietzsche, 
that human subjects be capable of creating their own myths, their own values to live by, and the 
challenge presented by this impasse is truly exciting for him.  But, regardless of the mythic 
potential of the individual agents who have cast aside tradition in modernity, with the weakening 
of mythic value in culture, modernity marks the disruption of traditional forms of identification 
and meaning-making; this loss also casts ethical systems as suspect and questionable.  In this 
sense, the “death of God” means not only the demise of the transcendental value of Christian 
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ethics but also the loss of authority in ethics determined through appeal to culture and to reason.  
As Nietzsche suggests about the “linguistics” of truth, we might similarly look at ethics as a 
matter of wordplay and nothing more. 
 
The prospect that community and culture may no longer possess the “narrative” coherence they 
once possessed is extremely troubling to many individuals, and with good reason.  If indeed 
traditional forms of communal identification cease to determine social roles and values, then, 
according to these individuals, all of our systems of ethical thought and action become negated.  
Realizing the devastating potential of such a social enervation, various attempts were launched at 
recovering and reconstructing the bonds of traditional society within modernity.  One such 
project is that of sentimentalism.  Sentimentalism‟s agenda seeks to heal the wounds of a 
fractured world by proclaiming communal solidarity and ethical capacity matters of the 
cultivation of affect.  By cultivating sympathy and affective relationships, sentimentalism posits 
the possibility of unifying a vastly disparate and fragmented social sphere.  In the following 
chapter, I will argue for a conceptualization of sentimentalism as an attempt to revivify 
traditional community, placing this attempt in direct opposition to West‟s modernist stance.  
Indeed, we should read Miss Lonelyhearts as a significant confrontation of modernist 
antisentimentalism – as professed by West – with the project of mass sentimentalism.  While we 
have various options for approaching a fragmented social sphere, sentimentalism being one such 
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III. WEST, MODERNISM, AND THE INTERROGATION OF ETHICS 
 
The break in historical continuity among traditional societies in modernity creates the need for 
restructuring the social through a reinvigorated mythos of public kinship and solidarity.  The 
Enlightenment sought to fulfill this need through two different approaches.  One, the familiar 
Enlightenment emphasis upon reason, approached the social as a site predicated upon rational 
institutions and right-mindedness in public affairs and civic practice.  The other, the less familiar 
counterdiscourse – particularly in the Earl of Shaftesbury‟s formulation of a public sphere 
consolidated through the fostering of affective kinship and sensibility – stressed the significance 
of the passions rather than the intellect and envisioned a reintegrated social world achieved 
through the exercise of fellow-feeling and the cultivation of affective relationships.  This 
counterdiscourse generated a popular form of sentimentalism that sought to re-envision the close 
bonds of traditional society in a public sphere gone awry and indelibly pluralistic.  This version 
of sentimentalism became a default ethical position within such a tumultuous social sphere 
characterized by difference, and, significantly, was utilized by the culture industry of nineteenth 
and twentieth-century America.  In various forms of mass media, the discourse of sentimentalism 
offered itself as a viable and coherent solution to the ethical crisis posed by modernity.  For my 
inquiry here, I would now like to take a closer look at this approach, specifically in the 
relationship between its rhetorical practices and the fostering of sympathetic feeling and 
relationships in building an ethical solidarity and moral commitment among the public.  As I will 
argue, sentimentalist ethics must be construed as an attempt at salvaging ethical community in 
the face of modern anomie.  However, in its attempt to salvage the human in modernity, 
sentimentalism, as Levinas would point out, consumes the human by abstracting and 
generalizing both particularity and the ethical relationship.   
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As such, the approach to ethical community on the part of popular sentimentalism is not 
without its opponents.  Among them, is the stance of the modernist avant-garde, which generally 
viewed sentimentalism as an abstraction of feeling and as an unsystematic approach to ethical 
action because of its relegation of ethics to the whim of human emotions and dispositions.  As 
several critics have argued, West can be read as representative of modernism‟s antisentimentalist 
response to negotiating authenticity in ethics.  In Miss Lonelyhearts, specifically, West 
approaches the problems of feeling and sentimental community through a satiric bent that seeks 
to expose these as inauthentic “ethical” solutions to the social needs posed by modernity.  For 
West, the need to overcome popular sentimentalism‟s rhetorical abstraction of the social world 
and the precedence it offers to the human subject in the ethical relationship (in the self‟s 
conceptualization of otherness through emotional faculty) is imperative to realizing an ethical 
approach capable of moving beyond being and sameness. 
 
One of the most striking passages in Miss Lonelyhearts comes not from Miss Lonelyhearts 
himself, or from Shrike, but, rather, is heard in passing as West gives the reader a scanning of the 
conversation at Delehanty‟s bar relatively early in the novel.  A group of men – described by 
West as Miss Lonelyhearts‟ friends, apparently from the newspaper – stand huddled together at 
the bar discussing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “approach to God”: 
“Even if he were to have a genuine religious experience, it would be 
personal and so meaningless, except to a psychologist.” 
“The trouble with him, the trouble with all of us, is that we have no outer 
life, only an inner one, and that by necessity.” (75) 
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Although they have just previously been delighting in the mocking of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire 
for religious piety, the commentary here provides a veritable recognition, a stark honesty, of 
what modernity means to human societies and individuals.  The absence of communal 
continuity, formerly provided by cultural and historical tradition, presents a turning away from 
collectivity towards the primacy of the self.  Most importantly, as this conversation between 
devoted bar revelers attests, modern subjectivity is characterized by an increasing interiorization, 
and, as such, alienation from the social whole and the world of others.  “By necessity” implies 
two significant details concerning the relationship between modernity and the subject.  First, it 
suggests that emphasis upon human self-internalization (as in modern individualism) necessarily 
means an otherwise irrevocable fissure in social participation and union – that is, with the 
primacy of self-interiority one comes to view the world and one‟s place within it no longer as an 
integrated whole but, instead, as a site of discrete objects apart from the self, distant from the 
ego.
12
  What is not-me is not-ego and is outside; what is outside, then, is to be feared, and the 
body (as the somatic site of selfhood) and the ego (as psychical site of selfhood) must maintain 
an unassailable integrity if what is outside is not to be permitted access to taint the self.  If not 
monitored “by necessity,” as one of the newspaper men suggests, the foreign and the stranger 
may be capable of compromising the I‟s self-security and personal comfort.  In this sense, then, 
“by necessity” means that what allows the self to maintain its integrity and comfort is the 
severance of personal attachments, a deferral of engaged social interaction and participation in 
order to avoid unpleasantness, suffering, and pain, which, however, is a severance that is much 
more than just mere symptom of anomie but also existential fact.  Second, “by necessity” claims 
                                                 
12
 Levinasian subjectivity, with its attention to the irrevocable separation of the ego from participation, could only be 
a product of capitalist modernity. 
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that community has necessarily been uprooted and culture vanquished, and all that remains is the 
individual alone in its isolation: “[W]e have no outer life, only an inner one.”  While the dialogue 
here gestures at the precarious nature of social attachment, ironically, these forms of modern 
anomie indicate the absence of “authentic” culture and shared value as the source of individual 
malaise and suffering in the novel. 
 What the social world of Miss Lonelyhearts lacks is a consolidated public sphere of 
shared value and belief; the significance of ritual and symbol (i.e., morally substantive shared 
communal practice and knowledge) has been lost.
13
  As Miss Lonelyhearts‟ crucifix upon one of 
his apartment‟s walls testifies, symbol no longer acts as an intermediary of the divine presence in 
things: 
The walls were bare except for an ivory Christ that hung opposite the foot of the 
bed.  He had removed the figure from the cross to which it had been fastened and 
had nailed it to the wall with large spikes.  But the desired effect had not been 
obtained.  Instead of writhing, the Christ remained calmly decorative. (67) 
In one of his retreats from the social world, Miss Lonelyhearts lays in his bed, attentively staring 
at the crucifix and chanting, “Christ, Christ, Jesus Christ.  Christ, Christ, Jesus Christ,” in a 
                                                 
13
 West uses the urban landscape of Miss Lonelyhearts to mimic the absence of traditional community and shared 
value in the novel.  When Miss Lonelyhearts walks across the park on his way to Delehanty‟s, he observes the 
manner in which the natural continuity of the physical world has failed to recycle itself: 
As far as he could discover, there were no signs of spring.  The decay that covered the 
surface of the mottled ground was not the kind in which life generates.  Last year, he remembered, 
May had failed to quicken these soiled fields.  It had taken all the brutality of July to torture a few 
green spikes through the exhausted dirt. 
What the little park needed, even more than he did, was a drink.  Neither alcohol nor rain 
would do. (63) 
Lacking fertility, the physical landscape hungers for a vital force that can reenergize the cyclical continuity of the 
natural order.  Mimicking the absence of social value, the physical world‟s thirst reflects the capacity in which the 
reanimation of the social cannot be satiated through either alcohol-induced escape or conventional ideas of 
community (“rain”). 
   
   
21 
 
desperate attempt to animate its impaled Christ; however, the Christ refuses animation and only 
remains mere aesthetic, “calmly decorative,” refusing to evoke the redemptive power that Miss 
Lonelyhearts hopes He will.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire to animate symbol, to coax out the 
divinity once evoked by religious images, correlates with his inept attempt to reanimate the 
social world through his Christ-solution.  In “Timid Defender of the Faith: The Prophetic Vision 
of Miss Lonelyhearts,” Janet St. Clair points out the significance of symbol to Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ project of consolidating the public through faith and religious belief.  Miss 
Lonelyhearts, though admittedly misguided,
14
 as St. Clair admits, “[N]evertheless finds hope in 
the eviscerated symbols that once connected humanity with its sources of transcendent power, 
and he seeks to translate that hope to others through the vehicle of those original images” (147).  
For St. Clair, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire to reanimate the social world is not solely informed by 
the perceived need to invigorate the masses by providing them with religious value and 
sustenance in their lives, but also by the necessity for Miss Lonelyhearts himself to arrive at a 
supreme understanding of the suffering of his readership.  “Thinking, working, and dreaming in 
symbols,” she states, “he exhausts himself in the attempt to make them not only express a 
legitimate meaning for contemporary existence, but to help him attain, shape, and organize that 
meaning, as well” (147).  West, however, exhausts all attempts launched by Miss Lonelyhearts 
                                                 
14
 Differing greatly from conventional exegeses of the text, St. Clair‟s reading of Miss Lonelyhearts is essentially 
optimistic.  For St. Clair, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ obsession with and performance of Christ contains within it the seeds 
of resuscitating both personal and communal value in the modern world: 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ primary goal is to experience love.  He seeks in love a motive and a method to 
heal the breaches leading to violence, insensitivity, and disorder and to restore both the spiritual 
and communal connections that humanize men and women.  His “Christ complex” betrays neither 
madness nor naiveté, but rather the supremely human attempt to locate and incorporate a 
dimension of meaning lying beyond the mundane physical plane. (147) 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ search for meaning beyond the physical world, then, represents the necessity for human beings 
to be capable of turning away from an essentially empty emphasis upon the intellect and the empirical (reflected in 
modern rationalism and scientific method) toward the spiritual (God‟s divine love as well as its finite form in human 
love) in resurrecting both existential value and communal solidarity. 
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either to enable communal life or to comprehend the significance – the rhyme and reason – 
behind both disintegrative social bonds and personal suffering in the contemporary world.  St. 
Clair traces these failures on the part of Miss Lonelyhearts to the changed nature of modern 
society and social perception: 
The problem, though, as his dreams of doorknobs, the lamb, and crosses testify, is 
not that there is no hope for a source of comfort in the contemporary world, but 
that either our shopworn symbols or our shallow and imbalanced modes of 
perceiving them perhaps no longer afford us access to transcendent power….  If 
traditional symbols have become vacuous, it is less the fault of symbols than of 
the ruptured methods of perceiving truth. (150) 
Unable to access the divinity of religious imagery and to extract personal meaning from religious 
belief and value, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ social world remains apart, as well as adrift, in the search of 
individuals for understanding and significance in personal suffering.   
Nonetheless, the desire to give meaning to personal pain and affliction – to be able to 
integrate these into a worldview that is somehow capable of redeeming human suffering and 
bestowing value upon human life – drives individuals forward, in Miss Lonelyhearts, in the 
pursuit of some sort of communal sustenance.  In this sense, the value of shared experience and 
of shared knowledge is found in their ability to provide an emotional, conciliatory solidarity 
among suffering individuals who are otherwise alone in their personal torment.  As St. Clair 
claims, “The city, severed from its own personal and collective spirit, out of touch with both the 
natural world and the symbols that might” bestow transcendence, “is not a community at all, but 
a pathetic collection of isolated individuals, emotionally overwhelmed and spiritually 
unsupported” (151).  We might say, then, that the real value of community is not only located in 
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the experience of sharing social values, but, also, in the sharing of experience itself – that is, in 
the therapeutic knowledge of mutual experience and emotional support.  However, the 
deterioration of fully-integrated, organic community in twentieth-century America provides few 
viable outlets for realizing the possibility of an emotionally supported and spiritually sustained 
public.  Rita Barnard, in “The Storyteller, the Novelist, and the Advice Columnist: Narrative and 
Mass Culture in Miss Lonelyhearts,” sees this problem, ironically, as both the product of late 
capitalism and the provenance of commercialized, mass-marketed advice in the America of the 
1930s.  Citing the work of Roland Marchand, Barnard states that the consolidation of a national 
market by the 1920s and 1930s, contributing to the relative “demise of smaller communities,” 
acted to create a vacuum of advice – that is, the age‟s “greater mobility, generational 
discontinuity, the isolation and shrinking of households in the new apartments and 
suburbs…tended to…disrupt the „informal, intrafamilial and intracommunity channels of 
advice‟” shared by small, integrated communities (42).  Mass-marketing, however, sought to 
profit from this severing of individuals from traditional forms of advice by offering consumers 
commodified versions of wholesome, down-home wisdom and knowledge, and as Barnard 
points out, these were to be found in sources as diverse as comic books, consumer goods, and the 
newspaper advice column. 
When we are first introduced to Miss Lonelyhearts in the novel, we see him sitting at his 
desk, laboriously attempting to compose his daily advice column for The New York Post-
Dispatch.  What he comes up with is nothing but pure commercialized rhetoric that promulgates 
a feel-good sentimentality: “„Life is worth while, for it is full of dreams and peace, gentleness 
and ecstasy, and faith that burns like a clear white flame on a grim dark altar‟” (59).  In search of 
some sort of moral response to his correspondents‟ pleas for help, Miss Lonelyhearts gives them 
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a version of rhetorical sympathy propagated by a mass-marketing structure only capable of 
recognizing the “needs” of the abstract market rather than those of the concrete individual, only 
capable of cultivating ego-gratification on the part of the ethical agent and perhaps even on the 
part of those receiving.  But the presence of real human suffering and moral need cannot be 
ignored when reading the letters of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents, and our initial 
acquaintance with his usual correspondent fare introduces us to the problematic nature of ethical 
response.  “Sick-of-it-all” writes the following in response to her husband‟s morbid desire for her 
to continue having more children even though this comes at the cost of risking her own life (due 
to failing health) and causing tremendous bodily pain: 
I am in such pain I don’t know what to do sometimes I think I will kill 
myself my kidneys hurt so much.  My husband thinks no woman can be a good 
catholic and not have children irregardless of the pain.  I was married honorable 
from our church but I never knew what married life meant as I never was told 
about man and wife.  My grandmother never told me and she was the only mother 
I had but made a big mistake by not telling me as it dont pay to be inocent and is 
only a big disappointment.  I have 7 children in 12 yrs and ever since the last 2 I 
have been so sick.  I was operatored on twice and my husband promised no more 
children on the doctors advice as he said I might die but when I got back from the 
hospital he broke his promise and now I am going to have a baby and I dont think 
I can stand it my kidneys hurt so much.  I am so sick and scared because I cant 
have an abortion on account of being a catholic and my husband so religious.  I 
cry all the time it hurts so much and I don’t know what to do. (59-60) 
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Next in line is “Desperate,” who is a teenage girl born without a nose, and obviously, very 
solicitous about her future in such a state: 
What did I do to deserve such a terrible bad fate?  Even if I did do some 
bad things I didn’t do any before I was a year old and I was born this way.  I 
asked Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that maybe I did something in the 
other world before I was born or that maybe I was being punished for his sins.  I 
dont believe that because he is a very nice man.  Ought I commit suicide? (60) 
The letters of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents implicate human beings in circumstances far 
greater than their control and comprehension.  The central inquiry, here, more than just solely 
asking for help, is how to make sense out of one‟s suffering in terms of one‟s morality.  Sick-of-
it-all‟s and Desperate‟s respective moralities do not seem to provide them with any sense of 
value or redemption.  Confronted with these prospects, why not commit suicide, they ask.  What 
this quasi-community of advice
15
 reflects is a characteristically human desire for emotional 
support and solidarity as well as the desire to place suffering within a comprehensive moral 
framework; this desire is met, then, in the newspaper‟s institutionalization of a sentimental 
community predicated upon the rhetorical practices of mass-market sympathy and fellow-
feeling.  Our questions to ask right now, however, not only concern the viability of such an 
ethical response as moral sentimentality, but also why mass sentimentalism might seem so apt, 
so easily suitable, to the occasion of providing moral support and authenticating communal 
experience in modernity, as well as why sympathy and affect seem so desirable in a capitalistic 
                                                 
15
 Barnard, whose critical approach to the text utilizes Benjamin‟s theory of the changed nature of shared knowledge 
under modernity, expounded in “The Storyteller,” argues that the very character of the advice column signals the 
absence of a viable community capable of translating experience into shared knowledge and wisdom.  “We cannot 
forget, moreover,” she writes, “that these confessions are letters written in isolation and confusion…, a situation that 
already signifies the disappearance of that community of tellers and interpreters in which advice is possible” (50).   
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public sphere where traditional social bonds and channels of moral support have been severed.  
These queries take us directly to the confrontation between West and popular, mass media 
ethical discourses of sentiment. 
 Though we must distinguish between philosophical and popular versions of 
sentimentality (and, indeed, the latter most concerns West in Miss Lonelyhearts), it is important 
to first place popular sentimentalism within the broader contexts of philosophical and social 
thought. Sentimentalist ethics finds its origins in Enlightenment and nineteenth-century 
discourses concerning the importance of sensibility.  The perceived critical need for one to 
possess sensibility was due to the desirability of overcoming the contingencies of an increasingly 
demanding public sphere, where close social attachments were becoming negated due to the 
rapidity of modern life and the impersonal nature of contemporary civic life.  “To be endowed 
with sensibility in its most attractive…form,” claims Andrew Burstein in Sentimental 
Democracy: The Evolution of America’s Romantic Self-Image, “meant to have an enlarged 
capacity to perform benevolent deeds, to show affection readily, to shed tears and empathize 
strongly with human suffering” (7).  The cultivation of sensibility, then, could lead to a stronger 
social and ethical cohesion among the modern masses.  As Burstein notes in regard to the Earl of 
Shaftesbury‟s sentimentalist approach to the moral consolidation of the public sphere, “[S]ociety 
was made strong and cohesive through the cultivation of intimate connections, the „natural, 
generous affections‟” (11).  This emphasis upon fostering affective relationships in order to 
resuscitate an integrated social world corresponds with sentimentalism‟s positing of authentic 
ethics as incapable of dissociation from emotional faculty.  For the sentimentalist ethical school, 
morality cannot distance itself from the ability of human beings to empathize with one another.  
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In Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life, Joseph Duke Filonowicz adeptly characterizes the 
significance of passionate feeling and affect to sentimentalism‟s ethical project: 
Sentimental moralists claim that in order to be fully successful, any justification 
for practicing altruism, living ethically, acting with regard to the interests of 
others, must appeal, ultimately, to human desires and emotions that are already 
other-regarding and benevolent in some sense on their own, prior to any abstract 
considerations concerning how one ought to live and act.  Successful ethical 
justification, in other words, must appeal to our sympathies, our natural concern 
for others; reason, detached from affect, emotion, passion, can never supply a 
satisfactory answer to the question, why be moral? or establish a general 
requirement that we live ethically. (4)  
Filonowicz reads a sentimentalist school that at once questions both the virtue and possibility of 
duty and motivation determined through abstract rationalistic principles, as well as posits moral 
action and intention as inseparable from emotion and desire.
16
  For this ethical project, he argues, 
“[P]urely rational motivation, altruistic or otherwise, simply does not exist,” meaning “that 
reason apart from desire is perfectly motivationally inert” and “that all motivation is necessarily 
motivation by wants” (53).  In other words, according to Filonowicz, it simply does not make 
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 Explicating sentimentalism‟s general “beef” with deontological ethics, for instance, Filonowicz calls into question 
the morality of rationally-constituted ethical intention: 
If a person acts beneficently, not from genuine concern for the weal of a fellow, but from some 
other motive (dutiful routine, religious obedience, self-interest) we should perhaps be glad at the 
outcome (a good was conveyed) but should hardly hold the agent in positive esteem for it.  His 
motivation falls short of direct, spontaneous and uncalculative engagement in other‟s good, of 
genuine moral concern….  This can be argued; perhaps there is something too disinterested, too 
detached in Kantian duty or otherwise rationalistic disinterestedness for it to count as truly 
virtuous motivation. (53) 
Intention, for the sentimentalist school, cannot be allowed determination by rational motivation, but, rather, must be 
spontaneously directed towards the other in the natural, authentic concern of the self for the other‟s well-being.  Any 
ethical action separated from this spontaneous intention of affect is therefore dubiously “moral,” perhaps even 
morally reprehensible, even if constitutively “ethical” in terms of right action. 
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sense that ethics can work apart from emotion, and to avoid emotion, along with the 
consideration of human passions, by “thinking” ethics avoids real ethical desire for the other. 
Furthermore, and most significantly, this desire to resurrect traditional community 
through the moral potential of human feeling and sympathy finds one of its most prominent loci 
in the popular culture of nineteenth and early twentieth-century America.  In order to repair and 
unify a radically disparate and pluralistic society, the discourse of sentimentalism became 
integrated into the cultural fabric of modern American society, meaning that sentimentalism was 
now available as a popular discourse of morality for the masses.  As a default ethical position in 
a pluralistic America, mass sentimentalism served as an intensely powerful social discourse and 
did indeed have real, valuable sociopolitical effects, most notably in the abolition of slavery and 
improved labor conditions.  A significant component of this discourse was the manipulation of 
sentiment in media and literature.  Both the novel of manners and the sentimental novel seek to 
articulate the need for refinement and affective sensibility among their respective readerships.  
Specifically, the sentimental novel reproduces and utilizes formulaic typologies of affect for 
engaging readerly desire and ethical awareness.  For Jane Tompkins, one of sentimentalist 
literature‟s most avid proponents, these conventional representations of feeling and suffering are 
not detrimental to cultivating a morally-engaged community of readers, but, instead, are 
completely capable of stimulating an authentic social awareness and solidarity.  In Sensational 
Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790-1860, Tompkins argues for a view of 
sentimental fiction that realizes the potential of sentimentalism to connect the reader with the 
reality of cultural and political life: 
Once in possession of the system of beliefs that undergirds the patterns of 
sentimental fiction, it is possible for modern readers to see how its tearful 
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episodes and frequent violations of probability were invested with a structure of 
meanings that fixed these works, for nineteenth-century readers, not in the realm 
of fairy tale or escapist fantasy, but in the very bedrock of reality. (127) 
According to Tompkins, the morality of sentimentalist fiction cannot be denied, particularly in 
its ability to engage readers in the moral dilemmas and social conflicts (whether gender, racial, 
class, political, etc.) of the day.  Any criticism denying this capability on the part of 
sentimentalism is informed by socially and historically contingent viewpoints.  “When critics 
dismiss sentimental fiction because it is out of touch with reality,” Tompkins argues, “they do so 
because the reality they perceive is organized according to a different set of conventions for 
constituting experience.”  Tompkins continues by stating that “the real naiveté is to think that 
that attack is launched from no perspective whatsoever, or that its perspective is disinterested and 
not culture-bound in the way the sentimental novelists were” (159-60).
17
  All attempts, then, at 
questioning the efficacy of popular sentimentalism in stimulating authentic ethical and 
sociopolitical awareness must be attuned to the manner in which culturally-contingent values 
inform our perceptions of systems of belief.
18
 
                                                 
17
 Filonowicz also recognizes the contingent nature of negative evaluations of sentimentalist ethics.  For Filonowicz, 
himself a contemporary proponent of sentimentalism, dismissal of sentimentalist ethics is informed by a rationalist 
discourse that negates the plausibility of negotiating an ethics through affective cultivation: 
Modern diffidence toward these earliest Moralists‟ [Filonowicz claims the early Sentimental 
school as the origins of modern moral philosophy] enterprise betrays a phobia of antirationalism 
or subjectivism that is itself likely to be highly historically conditioned.  It perpetuates a 
misunderstanding of their thought as well as an overly narrow and probably outmoded conception 
of the proper task of ethics. (45) 
Admittedly, it is easy to dismiss the validity of an affective ethics; however, what must be understood is the capacity 
in which all approaches to formulating ethical systems of thought is shaped by historically-situated value structures. 
18
 Nevertheless, sentimentalism has its detractors.  Ann Douglas, in The Feminization of American Culture, argues 
for an interpretation of sentimentalism as completely oblivious to the realities of sociopolitical life.  
“[S]entimentalism might be defined as the political sense obfuscated or gone rancid,” she claims, 
“Sentimentalism…never exists except in tandem with failed political consciousness.  A relatively recent 
phenomenon whose appearance is linked with capitalist development, sentimentalism seeks and offers the 
distraction of sheer publicity” (254).  According to Douglas, sentimentalism amounts not to ethical practicality but 
to mere commodified self-display.  As she states, “Involved as it is with the exhibition and commercialization of the 
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 What Tompkins‟ defense of sentimentalism attempts to eschew, however, is the 
problematic nature of realizing actually authentic feeling and affect in negotiating ethical 
response, particularly within the rhetorical discourses and maneuverings of mass sentimentalism.  
As the site of unprecedented atrocity, the twentieth-century spawned a backlash against the 
Enlightenment possibility of consolidating a social world, as well as cross-cultural 
understanding, through fellow-feeling and sentimental discourses propounding affective kinship 
and brotherhood.  One dissenting viewpoint was formally articulated and sketched-out in the 
modernist suspicion of emotional and affective sincerity, whether in artistic practice or social 
life.  Arising in the aftermath of the hermeneutics of suspicion
19
 employed by Marx (ideology), 
Freud (consciousness), and Nietzsche (metaphysics and epistemology),
20
 modernism tended to 
view, according to Jonathan Greenberg in “Nathanael West and the Mystery of Feeling,” “[E]ven 
the most sincerely felt emotion…as self-deception or ideological mirage.  With modernism, in 
other words, comes the suspicion that „genuine feeling‟ may not be so genuine” (589).  
Furthermore, leaving moral response up to the emotional contingencies and whims of individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
self, sentimentalism cannot exist without an audience.  It has no content but its own exposure, and it invests 
exposure with a kind of final significance” (254).  Douglas condemns sentimentalism for its formulaic 
commercialization of human emotional faculty, which has its end purely in display and lachrymose indulgence. 
 Similarly, many of the twentieth-century artistic avant-garde situate sentimentalism within a sociopolitical 
awareness gone awry.  For Brecht, for instance, sentimentalism represents a bourgeois indulgence in mawkish 
feeling as a result of inadequate cultural taste, as well as an avoidance of socioeconomic realities (Bell 162-63). 
19
 This term is often used to denote the “radical” thought of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche.  For Marx, the ideology of 
Western capitalist societies requires false consciousness on the part of the people, particularly those in the base.  
Ideology, or how a society consciously constructs and imagines itself, is, quite simply, not what it seems according 
to Marx.  Similarly, in Freud, consciousness is not fully aware of itself – that is, the self is motivated by and acts 
upon unconscious drives, instincts, and desires that are not available to consciousness.  Finally, Nietzsche casts 
suspicion upon the tradition of Western metaphysics and epistemology with his perspectivism.  Truth, for Nietzsche, 
is not a matter of objectivity; instead, truth is “created” by the various perspectives and positions from which human 
subjects approach and evaluate the world.  These three thinkers are essential in creating a climate for skepticism in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
20
 According to Nietzsche, even altruism as ethical intention is suspect.  Conceptualizing a vitalistic worldview, 
Nietzsche‟s positing the will to power as the “unconscious” motivation of human action attempts to rethink the 
apparent selflessness of altruistic intention.  For Nietzsche, the self‟s will to power cannot be severed from the 
motivation and practice of ostensibly selfless action.  In this sense, then, neither motivation nor action are devoid of 
egoistic intentions (whether conscious or not). 
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agents provides what many critics perceived as an inappropriately unsystematic response to 
situating really engaged interpersonal interaction.  Casting doubt upon the authenticity of 
affective response (as well as rationalistic ones for that matter) in approaching otherness, 
modernist antisentimentalism, then, critically engages the possibility of attaining a genuine 
system of morality.
21
  Greenberg posits the reemergence of satire
22
 in modernist literature as an 
attempt to reassess affective authenticity and ethical publicity (i.e., ethics capable of cohering 
and integrating a re-emergent social world).  In this sense, satire can serve a moral purpose in 
evaluating, ironically, the morality of “moral” response: 
[A]n important strain of modernism viewed the stringency and even cruelty of 
satire as a means of escaping from what were seen as the inauthentic and 
oppressive identifications enacted by feeling….  [S]atire reemerged as a powerful 
mode of fiction precisely when inherited conventions for the representation of 
suffering became discredited. (589) 
Specifically, in West, Greenberg reads an author directly confronting the problem of 
authenticating a potentially reinvigorated social world through the channel of sentimentalist 
discourse.
23
  West, Greenberg claims, “[E]xplicitly thematizes the problem of feeling throughout 
                                                 
21
 The avoidance of many modernist authors of directly confronting the sociopolitical world (for instance, in Joyce 
and Woolf) has contributed to the unfair association of modernism in-itself with moral bankruptcy.  As Greenberg 
points out, both conservatives‟ rejection of modernism as libertine and the left‟s rejection of modernist elitism in 
formal experiment and refined aesthetics (that ignore political imperatives) too easily skew the modernist project.  
“Despite obvious differences,” he states, “both charges share a distrust of modernism‟s well-known rejection of an 
aesthetics based in readerly engagement and sympathy, a rejection that is read…as a sign of amorality” (588).  
However, modernism‟s interrogation of sympathy is an explicitly ethical project in a modernity distinguished by the 
failure of Enlightenment discourses of moral action (rational and passionate) in both reinvigorating social bonds and 
realizing a Kantian cosmopolitanism. 
22
 “[I]f the era of modernism,” argues Greenberg, “was one in which the proximity of man and machine seemed to 
pose a greater threat than ever before, then satire,” with its presentation of “the human as mechanical, emerged as a 
mode all-too-suitable for modernity” (590). 
23
 Greenberg, however, posits a West that is critical of both sentimentality and satire: 
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his writing,” in which the “experience of particular feelings, particularly in response to scenes or 
representations of suffering, becomes itself the source of conflict…both within the text (that is, a 
character‟s conflict) and in the reader‟s reception” (590).   
 Other critics have also noted the importance of West‟s ironic brand of humor towards 
informing his ethical project.  As Justus Nieland argues, in “West‟s Deadpan: Affect, Slapstick, 
and Publicity in Miss Lonelyhearts,” West‟s use of humor reworks the boundaries of communal 
attachment in modernity.
24
  “[T]he radical potential of West‟s humor,” Nieland states, “lies in its 
exposure of the limits of public and communal belonging conceived in conventionally humanist 
terms – where community would be secured by sympathy and the logic of identity that subtends 
identification” (60).  In other words, West interrogates the drive towards ontological and 
epistemological sameness and homogeny present in the desire of sentimental community.  Satire 
is key here because it implicates the self as inhabiting a position within a social matrix that it is 
incapable of distancing itself from, and, for West, the self simply cannot abdicate the ethical 
relationship because the suffering of the other is close and cannot be ignored.  Distance, in this 
respect, is to avoid ethics altogether; however, the self is incapable of this deferral – ethics is not 
an option that the self may have or not have.  Furthermore, Nieland construes this ethical 
potential in West‟s ironic humor as an acerbic indictment of the self that would either establish a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although West‟s fiction subjects sentimental expressions of feeling to intense scrutiny, it is no less 
searching in its scrutiny of satire itself, and of the ironic or joking postures, often identified with 
modernist aesthetics, that dismiss feeling….  West‟s fiction at once manifests and resists a satiric 
impulse, and the push and pull of this ambivalence constitutes the central dynamic of his fiction.  
Such a struggle, we might venture, can even be seen as characteristic of modernity itself. (590) 
24
 Both Nieland and Greenberg represent a new wave of contemporary West criticism that is reevaluating the 
author‟s artistic project in terms of its sociopolitical and moral value.  If not completely dismissive of West‟s 
pessimism, these scholars, nonetheless, read an ethically-sensitive West who is attempting to both question 
conventional morality and to work through the possibility of a characteristically modern form of ethical possibility 
in the light of social anomie.  I will briefly sketch out Nieland‟s view of an ethical West below. 
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merely self-gratifying sympathetic bond with the other or otherwise seek to distance itself from 
moral engagement and imperatives altogether: 
[I]n Miss Lonelyhearts, our laughter, like our sympathetic identification with 
either the subject or object of the violence, is foreclosed – stalled by the scene‟s 
suspended presentation as neither fully proximate, inviting sympathy and pity, nor 
sufficiently distant, allowing a consoling disidentification. (58) 
Significantly, for Nieland, West‟s satire and irony can be viewed as preventing either full 
proximity or full severance with the object of suffering.  (Likewise, as readers, we can laugh at 
folly but are also implicated within this folly as human actors.)  While barring sympathy for and 
identification with the object, West simultaneously posits the inability to completely distance the 
self from moral engagement with the object.  
Similarly, if we turn, now, back to Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ineptitude in dealing with the 
needs of his readership, we see that West strands him between a laughter that would comfortably 
dissever him from his correspondents and a proximity that would be solidified through 
sympathetic identification, both of which, as West suggests, deface and dehumanize the other in 
her incomprehensible particularity.  In terms of West‟s antisentimentalism, this means that 
sympathetic proximity, specifically, avoids the imperatives of the ethical relationship by 
gratifying the ego and abstracting the other into a (comprehensible) object, now devoid of 
alterity; however, West simply will not permit sympathy to abstract and generalize the need for 
maintaining particularity in negotiating ethical relationships.  Referring to the “epistemological 
and ontological uncertainty of a rationalized and differentiated socius,” as presented in the letters 
of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents, Nieland states that “[i]n this world of uncertain 
feeling…Miss Lonelyhearts‟s project of sympathetic publicity – his desire to feel the pain of his 
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mass readership…can only fail, indeed, must fail” (58).  Miss Lonelyhearts (as well as us as 
readers) is not given direct proximity with his correspondents (with the exception of the Doyles); 
rather, they are mediated through a public discourse that espouses what is the affective desire of 
West‟s portrayal of sentimentalism as mere rhetorical practice.  In other words, Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ engagement with his readership is mediated through what West depicts as a 
hackneyed and trite public discourse of sympathy and feeling that is suitable to an age desirous 
of commodifying all things and thereby veiling the particularity of the world of discrete objects.  
“Lonelyhearts‟s quest to „love the whole world with an all-embracing love‟,” according to 
Nieland, “is thus comically confounded by both the uncertain ontological status of reified matter 
itself and by the affective particularities of the social – the eaches and everys of feeling” (67).  
Thus, it is “precisely these moments of emotional uncertainty, interruption, or incompletion,” 
when Miss Lonelyhearts is suspended between emotional particularity and the abstraction of his 
readers and social interactions, “where West frustrates sympathy‟s violence towards the affective 
complexity of the social” (74).  As Nieland continues, “Given his thorough cynicism about the 
possibility and desirability of such totalizing feeling, West‟s gambit is to maximize the 
particularity of the social as it suggests itself in the” pleas for help established through the 
correspondents‟ letters, “epistles that bear witness to suffering of such a freakish degree that 
Lonelyhearts‟s sentimental project can only fail” (67).
25
  Sick-of-it-all and Desperate frustrate 
                                                 
25
 Interestingly, this endeavor to maximize particularity, as well as the complicating of both identification and 
disidentification, is situated, for Nieland, within West‟s manipulation of the conventions of vaudeville comedy and 
slapstick: 
[V]audeville comedy oscillated between its jokework‟s social embeddedness – its sensory 
immediacy and social topicality – and its disembeddedness – its affective universality.  This 
comedy‟s mass appeal depended upon its negotiation of the particularity (ethnic and otherwise) of 
urban experience, yet its desire for a mass audience pushed it to elaborate reductive typologies, to 
embrace putatively universal themes, and to cultivate broadly resonant affects through an 
elaborate pseudoscience of emotional mechanics that would, presumably, reify a universal 
emotional current coursing through the audience. (64) 
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sympathy‟s desire for abstraction as well as self-gratification; the grotesque nature of suffering 
borne forth in their letters emphasizes an individual particularity that necessitates an ethical 
response capable of embracing the proximity and distance invoked by the ethical relationship – 
that is, the claim of the other upon the I (proximity) and the other‟s claim to particularity 
(distance).  Turning away from his former participation in Shrikean irony and wit, Miss 
Lonelyhearts recognizes the need for authenticity in ethics.
26
  Once again attempting to formulate 
                                                                                                                                                             
As Nieland further attests, this negotiation that betrays a dichotomy between the particular and the universal informs 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire for sympathetic totality: 
American vernacular comedy itself depended on specific sentimental protocols to negotiate an 
urban public sphere that seemed dangerously differentiated, or better, variously local.  In this 
sense, vernacular comedy‟s cultural work anticipates Miss Lonelyhearts‟s project of sentimental 
publicity: both must negotiate an increasingly heterogenous public sphere characterized by a 
vexing oscillation between the local and the universal, the particular and the typical. (63) 
26
 While I read this eschewing of Shrike‟s ironic stance, on behalf of Miss Lonelyhearts, as West‟s initiating a search 
for ethical authenticity and possibility in the novel, Nieland, however, views Shrike‟s irony itself – particularly as 
invoked in the deadpan – as an ethical counterdiscourse to modern communal desire.  We should, according to 
Nieland, “understand Shrike‟s frozen physiognomy not only as the result of reification‟s violence to the human, but 
also as a kind of critical antisentimentalism that both precipitates and follows this failure to secure „human nature‟” 
(66).  In what Nieland describes as its troping of West‟s antisentimentalism, Shrike‟s deadpan prevents the 
possibility of institutionalizing humanistic values within a consolidated public sphere of universalist affective 
normativity.  “Shrike‟s gesture unworks…,” claims Nieland, “and as such, its interruptive, historicizing gesturality 
forms an alternative model of publicness and community irreducible to humanist notions of interiority and identity” 
(66-67). 
 According to this reading, both comic antisentimentalism and ironic antihumanism attempt to counter 
modernity‟s desire for a universalized conception of the “human,” achieved through the unification of a public 
sphere predicated upon identity and sympathy, by resisting this desire and doggedly adhering to social alienation and 
individual particularity, both of which undermine the logic of traditional community and sympathetic identification.  
Shrike‟s “ethical” deadpan, then, along with his ironic wit, disarm Miss Lonelyhearts‟ attempt to stage what could 
be construed by critics as a universalist, bourgeois public.  Thus, for Nieland, Shrike‟s gesture is potentially ethical 
because it resists the totality of affect and the category of the “human”; it mimics the alienation of the social as well 
as modernity‟s inability to consolidate a community and a public through sympathy and ontological reification.  
Utilizing Agamben‟s notion of the atypical, inhuman public, endemic to modernity, Nieland posits the prospects of 
Shrike‟s (counter)public: “I want to suggest how Shrike‟s work, like his deadpan visage, demarcates the potential 
for a noninstrumental, indeed ethical publicness that only emerges by accommodating, not sentimentalizing, the 
spectacular emptiness of the modern public sphere.”  Nieland continues by claiming that “the alienated gesture of 
Shrike‟s face” is to be viewed “as a fully modern one, which is to say, resolutely non-nostalgic and non-
recuperative” (75).  For Nieland, then, Shrike‟s ethical potential lies in the ability of his critical gesture to rethink 
both the rationalized and the affective social world: 
Such modernist anti-sentimentality, then, is…an attempt to sever sympathy from the affective 
repertoire through which one experiences the reified public sphere of modernity, and thus, to 
square comic antisentimentalism with alternative, and perhaps more ethical, modes of public 
experience. (77) 
 What Nieland‟s celebration of Shrike‟s “ethical” deadpan gesture and irony fails to consider, however, is 
the manner in which such gestures and actions are not just suitable to modernity in their respective mimeses of 
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another sympathetic rhetorical display, Miss Lonelyhearts finds himself incapable of writing 
(and laughing) any further: “[H]e found it impossible to continue.  The letters were no longer 
funny.  He could not go on finding the same joke funny thirty times a day for months on end” 
(59).  Though he will, unfortunately, continue to grapple with sentimentalist rhetoric and its 
correlate of ego-gratification (particularly in his Christ-performance), Miss Lonelyhearts 
nevertheless consciously confronts the potential for violence, for other-effacement, in the very 
nature of “ethical” response. 
 
So, essentially, in its patterned, typological affective formulae, popular sentimentalism can be 
seen as an attempt at reifying a differentiated social reality into a unified abstraction of 
community.  By placing the particularity of his correspondents‟ suffering and needs into a 
narrative and rhetoric of sympathy and sentimentalist affect, Miss Lonelyhearts abstracts those 
he would otherwise wish to help.  West indicates that sentimentalist response and rhetoric only 
homogenize alterity into sameness, ignoring the particular needs of the sufferer and his or her 
radical demands upon the self. 
Though West everywhere subverts the affective “logic” of sympathetic identification and 
sentimentalist ethics, his critique that problematizes the role of emotional faculty in ethical 
intention nonetheless presents veritable difficulties.  A legitimate criticism of this approach to 
ethical authenticity concerns the practicality of severing emotional intent from moral action.  
How can we separate ethical action from emotional faculty, response, and engagement?  Isn‟t 
ethics, by its very nature, predicated upon the emotional desiring of the self for the other?  As 
                                                                                                                                                             
public and communal discontinuity, but are egoistic endeavors at making the self as comfortable as possible in terms 
of its relationships and interactions with others.  Shrike‟s deadpan simply provides a façade for him to hide behind 
in avoiding the suffering of individual human lives, everywhere present in Miss Lonelyhearts. 
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Filonowicz‟s defense of sentimentalist ethics aptly attests, the possibility of distinguishing 
ethical intention from emotional faculty is not only fraught with philosophical conundrum, but is 
also potentially morally reprehensible, considering that ethical action for some versions of 
antisentimentalist and antisubjective approaches to morality is no longer determined by right 
intention (i.e., the desire for the other‟s good).  Admittedly, West seems to acknowledge this 
critique in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ emotional turmoil, which I think is an important reason why 
West‟s antisentimentalism seems radically unique in the discourse of modernism.  Indeed, West 
appears obsessed with sentimentalism and with feeling.  As the most emotional and 
empathetically articulated figure in the novel (in both our readerly engagement with him and in 
his ability to empathize with others), Miss Lonelyhearts seems to be the only character fully 
committed to the realization of an ethical system adequate to the tasks set forward by modernity 
– a desire rarely separated from intention (that is, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ intentional commitment 
towards the other, viewed as his own choice) and emotion.   
However, it is this very emphasis upon intention (in any conventional ethics, whether 
sentimental or rationalistic) that, as I claim, West indicts for its dismissal of the ethical 
relationship and its affirmation of this relationship as symmetrical – for a motivation posited by 
the self is at bottom a testament to the perceived equitable character of ethics if not to the 
transcendence of the self in its relation with the other.  Bringing Nieland back into this 
conversation, can we really put all of our stock in a West who simply leaves us poised between 
proximity and distance in the ethical relationship?  Although, admittedly, we cannot consume the 
other‟s alterity through identification, nonetheless, we are, according to West, uncomfortably 
close to the other.  This proximity we cannot escape and cannot distance ourselves from, 
especially not through the faculty of intention.  For West, intention suggests condescension – that 
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is, intention posits the self as transcendent to the other and posits ethics as equilibrium and 
distance.  “Ethical” intention, then, affective or rational, cannot begin with the self.  One cannot 
come to the other, in authentic ethical desire, through a commitment instituted on the part of the 
ego; rather, one is commanded by the other to the ethical relationship – a command which cannot 
be avoided or deferred as well as exhausts the ethical subject‟s moral capacities.  As West 
claims, ethics is the experiencing and re-experiencing of a traumatism that can neither be 
conceptualized nor be therapeutically satiated, which explains why Miss Lonelyhearts is 
constantly bombarded by a suffering public that he cannot understand nor conceptualize, as well 
as why he can never do enough towards alleviating the burden of this command.  This emphasis 
upon the supererogatory demands of ethics brings West to a prescient anticipation of the work of 
Levinas in re-imagining the possibility for moral action within a totalizing modernity (whether 
bureaucratic, fascist, communist, capitalist, etc.).  Instead of conceiving ethics as a structure of 
symmetrical orientation, where the self and the other come together as a system of equity and 
equality, both West and Levinas attempt to challenge the limitations of conventional ethical 
understanding by citing ethics as an asymmetry, whereby the other remains irrevocably 
transcendent to the I, constantly placing claims upon the self that both create and affirm the 
traumatism of ethical subjectivity and moral desire. 
In order to better grasp West‟s ethical gesture towards modernity, I would now like to 
turn to an evaluation of what I deem as Levinas‟s ethics of traumatism.  This ethics, with its 
attention to the demands placed upon the self by the other, reworks ethical subjectivity and the 
moral relationship, and most importantly, helps us understand the discomfort of West‟s 
protagonist. 
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IV. LEVINAS’S ETHICS OF TRAUMATISM 
 
One approach towards understanding the ethical discomfort invoked by Miss Lonelyhearts and 
experienced by the advice columnist himself is suggested by the thought of Levinas, who posits 
as foundational to his ethical theory the inability of the ego to be made comfortable within the 
ethical relationship.  Like West‟s, Levinas‟s antisentimentalism is highly unique in the world of 
philosophical thought.  Both Levinas and sentimentalism (philosophical and popular) share 
origins grounded in the perceived need to situate moral response within a non-reflexive – i.e., 
spontaneous – ethical commitment (the cultivation of which, however, is highly problematic for 
sentimentalism).  Furthermore, the respective provenances of each moral agenda are very much 
indebted to the presence of suffering; however, Levinas‟s ethical traumatism takes a vastly 
different approach to this presence than sentimentalism does.  For Levinas, not only is ethics 
prior to intention, but also the sentimentalist response to suffering runs the high risk of perverting 
ethical response into narcissistic self-gratification.  Besides, there is a certain moral smugness in 
sentimentalism‟s position that suffering, for all of us, must indeed have a happy ending, so to 
speak.  To approach suffering in this capacity, as sentimentalism does, is, for Levinas, to 
discredit the authentic
27
 ethical relationship as well as the presence of suffering.  Discomfort and 
suffering are a part of being, and we cannot escape these or the proximity of the ethical 
relationship.  As such, Levinas posits both subjectivity and ethics as traumatism. 
But how exactly do we arrive at this argument in Levinas?  The intellectual career of 
Levinas is marked by the project of moving beyond Western epistemology and ontology in their 
respective reductions of intelligibility and being to objectivity and sameness.  Levinas 
                                                 
27
 My use of the term “authentic” in relation with Levinas‟s ethics is different than my use of the same term to 
designate sentimentalism‟s problem with realizing “true” feeling (as in the critique of Tompkins on page 30).  
Authenticity, for Levinas, doesn‟t necessarily need to correspond with feeling, though we should be careful to point 
out that Levinasian ethics never completely severs itself from the human capacity to empathize. 
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specifically calls out his philosophical predecessors, most notably in Husserlian transcendental 
idealism and Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics, for what he perceives to be their 
contributions to the impoverishment of metaphysics.  Ontology, according to Levinas, ignores 
the metaphysical relation of the other with the I (also the ethical relation), turning both being and 
the other into concept and generality, thereby esteeming sameness and the freedom of the self 
above the other.  “Ontology, which reduces the other to the same,” he states, “promotes freedom 
– the freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the 
other” (TI 42).  For Levinas, consciousness cannot reach an “outside” position – that is, an 
objective standpoint – from which it may view the world, making assumptions about knowledge, 
existence, and most importantly, the other.  Rather, consciousness is immersed within a dynamic 
social world of otherness and strangeness – a world where the other impresses the weight of its 
existence upon the I, commanding the I to response and to account.  “A calling into question of 
the same -,” argues Levinas, “which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is 
brought about by the other” (TI 43).  For this reason, then, Levinas claims that ethics precedes 
ontology: 
We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other 
ethics.  The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and 
my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my 
spontaneity, as ethics. (43) 
The ethical relation calls the freedom of the I, at home within itself, into question, commanding 
the I forward in order to account for itself before the presence of the other emanating from what 
he deems the face – the manifestation of infinity and transcendence in finite form.  The self 
attempts to reach its ethical capacity (which is essentially unreachable) towards the other in the 
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act of speaking, where the I comes to the other as a speaking subjectivity, as a giving 
signifyingness in the form of saying.  This giving of the self, however, is a vulnerability which 
Levinas describes as the most passive form of passivity, whereby the I is completely exposed to 
the unbearable burden of the other.  As Levinas emphasizes throughout his philosophical works, 
ethics is not an encounter of the self with the other in the manner of comfort, sympathy, and 
equality, but rather, ethics is a traumatic event that deracinates the I from the familiarity of its 
interiority (the chez soi) and commands a supererogatory giving and suffering on the behalf of 
the self. 
 
It is important to begin examining Levinasian ethics by acknowledging that, although he posits 
the primacy of the other in his philosophical project, Levinas devotes much attention to the 
nature of subjectivity in formulating his ethics.  Alone in its interiority, the self “enjoys” its 
“promiscuous freedom” and separation, what Levinas describes as its break from participation.  
Levinas calls this form of subjective non-participation the work of the atheist subject who has 
broken with God and the Infinite.  “One lives outside of God, at home with oneself,” states 
Levinas, “one is an I, an egoism.  The soul, the dimension of the psychic, being an 
accomplishment of separation, is naturally atheist.  By atheism we thus understand a position” 
characterized by “the breaking with participation by which the I posits itself as the same and as 
I” (TI 58).  The atheism of the subject is the irrevocable separation of the self in its freedom, in 
the chez soi that is at home within itself and within its egoist enjoyment.  The atheist subject 
inhabits the chez soi, a position from which it approaches the world of objects, appropriating 
otherness into a homogeny of the same (through the work of the I‟s consciousness).  However, 
this freedom is blind to itself and to being – that is, it is blind to the presence of the other who is 
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always already before the I.  Though subjectivity within the comfort of the chez soi is a 
blindness, according to Levinas, subjectivity is also a confirmation of infinity and ethical 
responsibility – a confirmation of alterity and otherness in their transcendence.  For Levinas, 
transcendence is “otherwise than being,” and subjectivity also betrays the otherwise than being 
that repels the assignation of essence (Otherwise than Being 8).  While a non-participation in its 
atheism, subjectivity cannot disavow itself as responsibility; more than anything else, 
subjectivity is responsibility for the other.  As Sara E. Roberts points out in “Rethinking Justice: 
Levinas and Asymmetrical Responsibility,” Levinasian subjectivity is to be viewed as “a kind of 
response to otherness,” wherein “I find myself involved with others in the very moment of my 
finding myself....  [T]he self is best understood as a kind of responsibility to and for the other” 
(6).  Subjectivity is not only a response to otherness, but is a responsibility towards the other who 
brings, who invites, the self into the world as a part of Goodness. 
According to Levinas, the Good is in subjectivity; the Good authorizes subjectivity and 
freedom because it determines commitment and obligation to the other against the I‟s will (OB 
10-11).  The Goodness of subjectivity, then, consists in the self‟s obligation to the other, which is 
a pre-ontological, pre-original necessity in that the other is always already present in the I‟s 
existence.  This is why Levinas does not allow for the I to determine its own commitment (as 
sentimentalism does, for instance) in both its own duty and the ethical relation: 
The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my 
decision.  The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the 
hither side of my freedom, from a „prior to every memory,‟…from the non-
present par excellence, the non-original, the an-archical, prior to or beyond 
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essence.  The responsibility for the other is the locus in which is situated the null-
site of subjectivity. (OB 10) 
We cannot equate ethical commitment with subjective intention in Levinas.  The subject does not 
come to the other having chosen this path for itself; rather, the subject is relentlessly commanded 
by the other who is preeminent to the I, always already invoking the I‟s response and duty.  This 
means that subjectivity is vulnerability and exposure, which are a part of the Good as subjectivity 
(OB 54).  The Good is present before choice and will and is the necessity that obligates the I to 
the other (OB 57).  This, then, is why subjectivity and ethics are an-archical – that is, defiant of 
origins.  “Goodness is always older than choice,” claims Levinas, “the Good has always already 
chosen and required the unique one” (OB 57).  The presence of the other in the I‟s existence is 
the trace of the Infinite, which confers the Good and responsibility.  The I contains the idea of 
the Infinite, meaning that the I thinks more than it is possible of thinking and knowing, and, as 
such, the I is overflowing with the Infinite and the other.
28
  “Infinity does not first exist, and then 
reveal itself,” Levinas argues, “It is produced in the improbable feat whereby a separated being 
fixed in its identity…nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely 
by virtue of its own identity” (TI 26-27).  Infinity establishes the subject within an ethical 
relationship with the other that can neither be ignored nor satisfied; it demands the subject to 
assume its unique responsibility, which is a duty unto the other unlike any other (indicative of 
the absolute particularity of both duty/obligation and the other).  In “Ethics, Religiosity and the 
Question of Community in Emmanuel Levinas,” Thomas A. Carlson adeptly characterizes 
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 According to Levinas, infinity produces metaphysical desire – that is, the desire for the absolutely other that is 
insatiable.  “Infinity is not the „object‟ of a cognition…,” he states, “but is the desirable, that which arouses Desire, 
that is, that which is approachable by a thought that at each instant thinks more than it thinks” (TI 62).  Incapable of 
containing the Infinite within the idea of infinity, the subject nonetheless is capable of desiring towards infinity in 
the ethical relation. 
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Levinas‟s sense of responsibility as an obligation particular to the unique, individual subject.  
“Like my death in Heidegger,” Carlson states, “which no one can take over for me, my 
responsibility in Levinas signals what is most mine and what is mine alone.  Insofar as 
responsible, I am singular, and, indeed, only insofar as singular can I be responsible” (60).  Thus, 
the self is always already engaged within a responsibility towards the other (and every other) that 
is unique and unrepresentable, incapable of being placed into universalist assumptions of 
normativity and ethical practice – the infinition [mode of being] of the Infinite that resists 
totality. 
 But what exactly constitutes ethical experience for Levinas, and how does the self 
attempt to fulfill its responsibility towards the other?  How does the self come to a recognition of 
its duty that is a taking, an affirmation of, responsibility?  As Levinas claims, the I comes to the 
other in the experience of its shame and guilt before the other‟s presence.  This experience of the 
I‟s conscience is a movement of metaphysical desire
29
 towards the other.  According to Levinas, 
the other “is desired in my shame” (TI 84), and moral consciousness begins when the I‟s freedom 
is called into question by the experience of the other in shame, whereby the freedom of the I is 
recognized as an injustice: 
Conscience welcomes the Other.  It is the revelation of a resistance to my 
powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in question the 
naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being.  Morality 
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 For Levinas, desire is not lack or need, but, instead, is spontaneous and insatiable; metaphysical desire desires the 
absolutely other: 
The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, 
for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never 
betake ourselves.  The metaphysical desire does not rest upon any prior kinship.  It is a desire that 
can not be satisfied. (TI 33-34) 
In this sense, then, metaphysical desire desires beyond anything that can complete it and takes the subject outside of 
its comfort within itself as an I. 
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begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be 
arbitrary and violent. (TI 84) 
Welcoming the other in shame and guilt calls into question the I‟s freedom, forcing the I into a 
recognition of the violence it perpetrates, as an atheist chez soi, upon alterity and otherness.  
Levinas deems this welcoming “as-sociation,” wherein conscience is a non-a priori (conceptless) 
experience of the Other.  “If we call a situation where my freedom is called in question 
conscience,” argues Levinas, “as-sociation or the welcoming of the Other is conscience….  [I]n 
conscience I have an experience” of the other “that is not commensurate with any a priori 
framework – a conceptless experience.  Every other experience is conceptual, that is, becomes 
my own or arises from my freedom” (TI 100).  When I experience guilt and shame before 
another individual, that person possesses a power over me that I have no way of accounting for 
or dissembling; she presents an enigma to me that breaks with my power to make the world my 
own or to act according to my freedom.  Additionally, this welcoming of the other, which is the 
precondition of language, is predicated upon subjectivity‟s origins in justice, responsibility, and 
obligation.  “The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of my own injustice,” 
claims Levinas, “ – the shame that freedom feels for itself” (TI 86).  Freedom‟s experience of 
guilt and conscience, furthermore, welcomes in as-sociation the possibility of truth, which has its 
locus in society (TI 101).  For Levinas, the experience of conscience is the self‟s vehicle towards 
recognizing its responsibility towards the other which it has neglected,
30
 and it is in language that 
the self approaches the other in its responsibility. 
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 As Spargo points out, Levinas argues that our neglect of the other is a turning away from our responsibility, and, 
thus, an act of violence and “murder.”  Spargo claims that the bad conscience is significant here because it acts as a 
means for the self to come into awareness of its neglected responsibility; however, this awareness is always 
untimely and too late.   “[T]he bad conscience is also oddly cast as a figure of mourning,” writes Spargo, “The moral 
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 As Levinas posits, language provides the network by which the work of metaphysical 
desire moves towards the other.  Brian Schroeder, in Altared Ground: Levinas, History, and 
Violence, states that, in Levinas, “Language institutes the metaphysical (ethical) relation….  The 
ethical self is desirous of the Other, not for the sake of possession or dominance, but to formulate 
a dialogical relation” (108).  Language, according to Levinas, is the force that cultivates the 
metaphysical desire for the otherwise than being, whereby the I is made to open itself up to the 
inquiry of the other
31
: “The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is primordially 
enacted as conversation [discourse], where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an „I,‟ as a 
particular existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself” (TI 39).  Language is a giving over of 
the self and forces the self into a confrontation with the other that can‟t be deferred; language, as 
conversation, calls the I into question, demanding the I to account for its actions towards the 
other before the presence of the other: 
                                                                                                                                                             
subject‟s regretful belatedness – in which he comes to consciousness after the fact of murder – brings about 
vigilance” (104). 
31
 Levinas distinguishes between two types of language: the said and saying.  These two distinctions become most 
relevant to his work in Otherwise than Being, and, although clearly in development, do not take precedence in his 
discussions on language in the earlier Totality and Infinity. 
What is explicit in his earlier work, however, is the distinction between conversation as speaking (which is 
on the side of the other) and conversation as rhetoric (which is on the side of sameness and the I in its enjoyment).  
Levinas describes rhetoric, then, as a violence of injustice that dissimulates the face to face encounter: 
Rhetoric, absent from no discourse, and which philosophical discourse seeks to overcome, resists 
discourse (or leads to it: pedagogy, demagogy, psychagogy).  It approaches the other not to face 
him, but obliquely – not, to be sure, as a thing, since rhetoric remains conversation, and across all 
its artifices goes unto the Other, solicits his yes.  But the specific nature of rhetoric (of 
propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.) consists in corrupting this freedom.  It is for this that it is 
preeminently violence, that is, injustice – not violence exercised on an inertia (which would not be 
a violence), but on a freedom, which, precisely as freedom, should be incorruptible….  To 
renounce the psychagogy, demagogy, pedagogy rhetoric involves is to face the Other, in a 
veritable conversation. (70) 
For Levinas, rhetoric (like the said) is present in all language, but the ethical capacities of language can be exercised 
in the ability of the I to meet the other as face, which requires responsibility in speaking.  This responsibility in 
language is predicated upon both the face that presupposes language and language as saying.  I will discuss the said 
and saying, as well as the significance of the face to the ethical relationship, at length below. 
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Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me 
and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the 
reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very 
fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over 
this egoism, and hence in justifying oneself. (TI 40) 
While language maintains the distance and separation between the I and the other (the necessity 
of distance invoked in psychism, or consciousness), language also engages the subject in an 
unavoidable confrontation with the other, who, in the address,
32
 commands the I‟s response.  As 
subjects, we sojourn in a social world where communicative interaction calls us to conscious 
experience; we come into subjective awareness through the dynamism of linguistic structures 
and discursive engagement.  Therefore, as Levinas claims, “Discourse is not simply a 
modification of intuition (or of thought), but an original relation with exterior being” (TI 66), 
constantly desituating the subject and exposing the I to its vulnerability and nakedness.  In this 
opening up of the subject, the I is made nude and vulnerable (that is, laid bare before the other) – 
the I is made to respond to the other as the I‟s obligation and responsibility.  By speaking, the 
other puts the I into question and becomes an interlocutor who disrupts the I‟s power either to 
enjoyment (mastery and freedom of separation) or knowing (concept and thought) of the other.   
On the side of the other is not only speaking (the other as the I‟s interlocutor) but also the 
face that institutes the process of ethical interchange in social and communicative interaction.
33
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 I would argue that the “address,” for Levinas, is not only the address of the other to the I in the form of the 
“Hello” (the greeting), but is also the invitation to consciousness and subjectivity offered to the I by otherness.  Both 
addresses command the I to a response to the other. 
33
 According to Levinas, the face is the trace of infinity; it is the finite manifestation of the Infinite.  In Toward the 
Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas, Michael B. Smith summarizes this relationship between the 
face and infinity as that of the trace to presence: 
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The face to face encounter, which presupposes language, provides an opening for communion in 
the I‟s obligation and responsibility to the other; the presence of the face is already discourse and 
speaking.  “The face is a living presence,” writes Levinas, “it is expression.  The life of 
expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby 
dissimulated.  The face speaks.  The manifestation of the face is already discourse” (TI 66).  The 
face refuses concept and form; the other refuses thematization even as the I‟s language makes 
him into theme.  Regardless of what the I‟s language desires, the face speaks through the form 
that would attempt to limit it (TI 198).  Before the I, the face of the other is always nude and 
vulnerable, and yet, it refuses the image and concept that claims to grasp it and would otherwise 
limit it: 
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in 
me, we here name face….  The face of the Other at each moment destroys and 
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and 
to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea….  It expresses itself.  (TI 50-
51) 
The face is expression in Levinas, and the expression of the face resists the mediation of the 
image, persistently destabilizing the form (concept) to which I attempt to appropriate the other 
into “my own measure,” my own consciousness and language.  Furthermore, the face, the 
speaker who acts as the I‟s interlocutor, is always present in his speech, attending his own 
manifestation as expression, and therefore, resisting what Levinas calls “vision” – the desire to 
                                                                                                                                                             
The concept of the “face,” which indicates the presence of alterity, is the mediating 
concept by which the infinite is manifested in and to the finite.  But the term “manifested” is not 
the proper term for any effect or action on the part of the infinite, since the latter is characterized 
by lack of manifestation.  A demotion to the status of being would alter its quality of infinity.  This 
is perhaps why Levinas develops the idea of “the trace,” a more discreet form of evidence of the 
presence of the infinite within the finite. (35-36) 
   
49 
 
pin the speaker (the other) down into image (TI 296).  For this reason, according to Levinas, the 
presence of the face makes the world uncommon, in the sense that the other resists the I‟s desire 
towards sameness: 
The Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his 
epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be 
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our 
existence. (TI 194) 
By desituating the I‟s world, the face‟s expression exposes the I‟s mastery over the world of 
objects as illusory and false.  “The expression,” states Levinas, “the face introduces into the 
world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power” (TI 198).  
Expression is the imposition of the face upon the I, wherein the I‟s mastery is dissimulated and 
its responsibility and obligation posited, thus making claims upon the I to respond as an ethical 
subject. 
 The manifestation of the face confers ethical responsibility; it commands the I into the 
ethical relationship as a responsible speaking subject – that is, the face commands the I to 
approach it in its otherness through the act of speaking in the form of “saying.”
34
  Avoiding 
ethical responsibility in language, however, attempts to defer the face of the other from the I‟s 
presence and is aligned with what Levinas deems “the said.” The said, in its deferral of 
responsibility, seeks to make the world common, seeks to veil the face that speaks to me, 
reinforcing my sense of mastery and knowing.  “The birthplace of ontology is in the said,” states 
Levinas (OB 42).  The said seeks out essence and entity, and as such, it is on the side of Being, 
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 Saying belongs to the face in Levinas; it is the exposure that is the face‟s expression as discourse.  As Schroeder 
states, “Saying refers to subjectivity‟s „exposure‟ to the Other where the demand of responsibility and obligation is 
impressed upon the self.  This „pre-original saying‟…is expressed as the an-archic trace of the Infinite within the 
face” (111). 
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Truth, and logos.  Any attempt of mine to speak about the world, to make it common, is the 
desire of the said to thematize what is external to me.  According to Schroeder, “The said is 
language which makes propositional statements or declarations about the truth and falsity of an 
event or thing” (111).  As such, the said is an attempt at triadic representation, meaning that it 
seeks to avoid the dyadic (and dialogic) encounter between the I and the other by moving outside 




Whereas the said desires towards sameness and stability, saying is a disruption of this 
linguistic network, whereby I meet the other as a responsible ethical subject, responding to and 
speaking to the other rather than speaking about the other as well as the world.
36
  Saying is the 
“proximity of one to the other,” it is “the very signifyingness of signification” (OB 5).  Levinas 
claims that responsibility is in saying – it “is put forth in the foreward,” posited in the address 
(OB 5).  In saying, the I approaches the other with giving and signifyingness, whereas, in the 
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 The diversion of ethics to the triadic – that is, the third-person – denies the ethical relationship, which can only be 
in the encounter of the self with the other in responsibility.  In Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics 
of Resistance, Simon Critchley describes the move from the dyadic to the third-person as a move towards symmetry 
and equality.  According to Critchley, the other can only be experienced in her alterity as the apogee of what 
Levinas terms the “asymmetrical curvature”: 
When I am actually within the ethical relation, I experience the other as the high point of this 
curvature.  As such, the relation can only be totalized by imagining myself occupying some God-
like, third-person perspective outside the relation….  [T]he relation between myself and the other 
only appears as a relation of equality, symmetry and reciprocity from a neutral, third-person 
perspective that stands outside that relation.  When I am within the relation, then the other is not 
my equal and my responsibility towards them is infinite. (59-60) 
Defining ethics – that which is only within the dyad – as asymmetrical, then, means that the other (as manifestation 
of the Infinite) is transcendent to the I; the ethical relationship between the self and the I cannot exist as an 
egalitarianism but can only be experienced through the asymmetrical curve, wherein the other stands preeminent to 
the self. 
36
 Ironically, though saying disrupts the said and the stasis of language, saying is teleologically directed towards the 
said (OB 37).  According to Levinas, the said doesn‟t have priority over saying but it does absorb it.  As such, saying 
is both an affirmation and a retraction of the said.  Saying, as soon as it is conveyed, “is betrayed in the said that 
dominates the saying which states it” (OB 7).  However, saying goes beyond essence and is bound with diachrony, 
which resists totality (the synchronization of the same).  The diachrony of saying is transcendent in that is resists 
history and memory‟s desire for synthesis and synchronization; the diachrony of saying is other than being.   
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said, the I only attempts to ascribe meaning to the other rather than hold communion with him.
37
  
As giving signifyingness, saying is an “unblocking of communication” and is exposure of the 
self, whereby the self is made vulnerable by the other: “It is in the risky uncovering of oneself, in 
sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas, 
vulnerability” (OB 48).  In describing the process of saying, Levinas unleashes a vocabulary 
invoking the traumatic, harrowing nature of ethical encounter and experience; saying – the 
ethical encounter – is a dramatic and gut-wrenching interchange between the I and the other that 
uproots the I from the comfort of the chez soi.  The I is vulnerable in the act of saying and is 
exposed, laid bare: “The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as a 
cheek is offered to the smiter” (OB 49).  Levinas claims that saying is the most passive form of 
passivity (makes the I vulnerable before the other), the “for-the-other” of speaking, that denudes 
the self before the presence of the other and desires the other beyond being, beyond the said, 
even though such desire means suffering and pain for the self who lies powerless before the 
other.   
Significantly, saying as subjectivity – saying as the I held hostage to the other in its 
responsibility – signifies the traumatism of ethical experience, and, therefore, ethical subjectivity 
and responsibility lend themselves not to the familiarity of the chez soi but to the violence of 
ethical encounter.
38
  My responsibility and obligation toward the other is preeminent to anything 
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 Though saying seeks communion with the other, it also disrupts (like the face) the world that is common.  Carlson 
states that “„saying‟ does not join or unite, but rather separates me from the other, for the radical priority of 
responsibility, which „saying‟ precisely signifies, dispossesses me of any stable, thematic language through which I 
might mediate between myself and the other” (62).  According to Carlson, saying brings together the “inequality” 
that exists in the relation between the I and the other (which he describes as “a function of the irreversibility of the 
relation”) with the “non-equality of the self with itself (a function of the self‟s irreplaceability)” (62-63). 
38
 It is important to note that although Levinas describes ethics as a violence, ethical violence – that is, ethical 
trauma – is not to be conflated with the violence the I perpetrates against the other in its atheist separation, a 
violence which is injustice. 
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that I am capable of actually ever delivering unto the other and for the other; my duty towards 
the other is excessive and obsessive, making ethics, for Levinas, supererogatory by nature.  “In 
Levinasian responsibility,” states Spargo, “we venture outside the permissible limits of 
exteriority‟s obligating force (for instance, as Kantian duty) to find ourselves” in a responsibility 
that exceeds any sense of ethical duty “we imagined, subjects suddenly not to obligations of our 
choosing but, rather, to what lies beyond our culturally self-limiting constructs of obligation” 
(17).  Because my ethical obligation to the other exceeds, by far, anything that I can or may 
deliver unto him – is beyond my capacities as an I – my responsibility and duty are never 
fulfilled and always commanding me to action whether I will this action or not.  As such, ethics 
is a traumatism constantly weighing upon me – an unbearable burden that presses against any 
capacity I possess whatsoever towards fulfilling my ethical duty before the other.  Levinas‟s 
persistence with his characterization of the ethical relationship as a trauma allows ethical 
subjectivity to be viewed as the experience of what Critchley depicts as neuroses: 
Levinas describes the relation of infinite responsibility to the other as a trauma….  
In short, the Levinasian ethical subject is a traumatic neurotic….  The point here 
is that, for Levinas, the ethical demand is a traumatic demand, it is something that 
comes from outside the subject, from a heteronomous source, but which leaves its 
imprint within the subject.  At its heart, the ethical subject is marked by an 
experience of hetero-affectivity.  In other words, the inside of my inside is 
somehow outside, the core of my subjectivity is exposed to otherness. (61) 
As an ethical subject, the I is obsessed with the other that presses upon the self.  This obsession, 
this neurosis, however, is irrevocable, insatiable, and incurable – it weighs upon the self who can 
neither be satiated within the presence of the object of obsession nor satiate the object of 
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obsession itself, the object that confers selfhood and demands responsibility.  One might argue, 
then, that for Levinas, subjectivity itself is never fulfilled in the sense that the self is never really 
all together there – that is, the self never reaches itself, never comes into its own (the self never 
reaches and fulfills the capacities demanded of selfhood) because of the other‟s constant 
desituating of identity.
39
  If indeed ethical experience is that of neuroses, then ethics and ethical 
subjectivity seem to always elude the subject; ethics-in-itself is a presence of which the face and 
saying are traces but which we, as ethical subjects, can never grasp or obtain whether in our 
language or our actions. 
 
Now that I have approached Levinas‟s ethical philosophy, with attention to both the problems of 
ethical subjectivity in acting responsibly towards the other and the traumatic nature of ethics, I 
would like to use the following chapter in order to advance my argument concerning West‟s 
moral project.  Shifting attention to the text of Miss Lonelyhearts once again, I will be placing 
the novel within a specifically Levinasian framework.  As I have suggested above, this approach 
will help elucidate West‟s ethical capacity as an author who is sincerely attempting to come to 
terms with the dissolution of traditional communities in modernity as well as interrogate the 
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 This current in Levinas‟s thought is somewhat analogous to that of Lacan‟s; however, for Lacan, desire has 
origins (though objet a – the petit object of desire – is always an unconsciousness – that is, pursued and experienced 
by the subject within the unconscious) and is predicated upon need and lack (rather than spontaneous).  Desire, in 
Lacan, seeks to fulfill a void in the subject‟s existence.  Both Levinas and Lacan, though, view desire as insatiable, 
and, furthermore, the subject, for both thinkers, is incapable of eradicating alterity from the ego. 
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V. WEST’S ETHICAL ALTERNATIVE:  
     APPROACHING MISS LONELYHEARTS THROUGH LEVINAS 
 
In the pages of Miss Lonelyhearts, West offers a world where the human subject is precariously 
poised between two options for negotiating interpersonal relationships: we may either ignore the 
moral claims of the other, choosing for ourselves what is hopefully as easy or comfortable a life 
as possible, or we may make a commitment to the burden of ethical imperative (which, 
ironically, as in Levinas, is a commitment not of our own choosing because obligation towards 
the other is non-intentional).  For both West and Levinas, the deferral of ethical responsibility 
through self-insulation can become a coping mechanism for dealing with the complexities of 
morality and everyday life.  Though we tend to think of coping in today‟s society as a positive, 
therapeutic strategy in terms of personal health, neither of the two authors regard this approach to 
situating one‟s place within a persistently traumatic world as ethically responsible.  Instead, 
responsibility is conferred by subjectivity itself and is assumed by the subject when he or she 
embraces the trauma of interpersonal experience.  In this chapter, then, I will argue that Miss 
Lonelyhearts must be read as an attempt on the part of West‟s protagonist to embrace ethical 
trauma as well as come to an understanding of what exactly this embrace entails.  As West 
gestures through the experience of his protagonist, this embrace requires the subject to be 
capable of managing a public sphere mediated through a dead language and through a “culture” 
of degradation that consistently balks the desire for ethical sincerity.  Furthermore, and perhaps 
most importantly, this embrace stipulates that the ego must be overcome, and, therefore, the self 
in its freedom and enjoyment – the self as master and ego that would hide within itself as coping 
– is the greatest obstacle towards responsibility. 
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It is a particular hobby of Shrike‟s in consistently mocking the ethical impulses of his troubled 
advice columnist, specifically targeting Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-solution for the brunt of his 
ironic invective.  After Miss Lonelyhearts storms out of Shrike‟s apartment in hot pursuit of 
Betty in “Miss Lonelyhearts Attends a Party,” Shrike playfully reads the letter intended to Miss 
Lonelyhearts from Doyle (a letter which threatens Miss Lonelyhearts for supposedly raping 
Doyle‟s wife and betraying his trust), scoffing at the latter‟s religious stance: “„But I can‟t 
believe it.  I won‟t believe it.  The master can do no wrong.  My faith is unshaken.  This is only 
one more attempt against him by the devil‟” (120).  If Miss Lonelyhearts is placed within the text 
in order to establish a will towards moral sincerity, then Shrike is that presence in human beings 
that degrades all pretenses towards piety and moral responsibility.  According to Shrike, Jesus is 
himself merely “the Miss Lonelyhearts of Miss Lonelyhearts” (65), pointing to what he believes 
to be the ineptitude of both moral response and religious value.  Analogous to his criticism of 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical desire as simple performance, Shrike‟s pessimistic portrayal of Christ 
here depicts Jesus as a petty performer attempting to fulfill and enact the formulaic role of the 
scapegoat that is sacrificed in order to atone for perceived sins and cultural failures, thereby 
helping to regenerate a disillusioned society.   
Not only does Shrike enjoy debunking the sincerity of Christ and his protégé in Miss 
Lonelyhearts, he also takes a perverse delight in making the letters into objects for his 
enjoyment.  Reading the letters out loud for the amusement of himself and his company, Shrike 
makes a game out of the inquiries of the correspondents
40
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 In The Fiction of Nathanael West: No Redeemer, No Promised Land, Randall Reid deftly evaluates Shrike‟s 
parodic desire as his own unconscious parodying of self: 
And the parody does not end with Shrike‟s targets.  It extends to Shrike himself – a cartoon of a 
satirist whose every gesture is artificial and whose stance is as derivative as it is destructive.  Thus 
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“Here‟s one from an old woman whose son died last week.  She is seventy 
years old and sells pencils for a living.  She has no stockings and wears heavy 
boots on her torn and bleeding feet.  She has rheum in her eyes.  Have you room 
in your heart for her?” (119) 
Delighting in his ability to mock and pun, Shrike simply reads the letters as objects that have no 
bearing upon his personal life and his concern.  Shrike‟s bit is to disembody the individual 
correspondents through play rather than embodying them – that is, visualizing them as real 
human beings with real issues and concerns – as Miss Lonelyhearts attempts to do.  Shrike‟s 
irony, then, helps to act as a distance between himself and the claims of the other.  As Jeffrey L. 
Duncan claims in “The Problem of Language in Miss Lonelyhearts,” Shrike‟s humor functions as 
“symbolic consciousness,” involving “the displacement if not the annihilation of persons, their 
particular reality, by words, a particular scheme of concepts” (119-20).  Through his games with 
the letters, Shrike is capable of robbing their authors not only of their individuality but also of 
their suffering.  Shrike‟s mocking stance aids him in disarticulating the words of the 
correspondents and the actions of Miss Lonelyhearts, debarring their claims to sincerity as well 
as their desire to make the world meaningful and valuable. 
Though Miss Lonelyhearts‟ project is to (re)articulate his readers and the moral sincerity 
of his society (obviously, his is a very flawed attempt), as we are aware from the very opening of 
the narrative, Miss Lonelyhearts has also formerly participated in Shrikean irony.  Like his 
editor, Miss Lonelyhearts has also presumably reveled in the debasement of his correspondents, 
taking pleasure in their effacement and laughing at their pathetic “humanity.”  He too viewed the 
                                                                                                                                                             
satire is, in the person of Shrike, satirized, and mockery is thereby disqualified as an adequate 
response to human misery. (44) 
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letters as a game – jokes for a job he once considered a joke itself.  However, unlike Shrike, Miss 
Lonelyhearts cannot find permanent sustenance within this continual game of parody and 
mockery; Miss Lonelyhearts, for whatever reason, no longer experiences the apparently 
“intrinsic” humor of the letters: 
Although the deadline was less than a quarter of an hour away, he was still 
working on his leader.  He had gone as far as: “Life is worth while, for it is full of 
dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy, and faith that burns like a clear white 
flame on a grim dark altar.”  But he found it impossible to continue.  The letters 
were no longer funny.  He could not go on finding the same joke funny thirty 
times a day for months on end. (59) 
Here, we witness Miss Lonelyhearts pausing in the formulation of a trite, sympathetic message 
conveyed through the conventions of mass-publicity and consumerism, pausing in the formation 
of yet another formulaic rhetorical move produced for the consumption of his readership.  He 
refuses to continue to laugh at the letters and decides for once to take them seriously.  Indeed, 
what he refuses as well is his alliance with the worldview of Shrike; Miss Lonelyhearts breaks 
with his participation in a Shrikean irony that would otherwise erase the other and her moral 
claims upon him.  “Miss Lonelyhearts no longer finds the letters funny,” states Duncan, “because 
he refuses to consent to this displacement, to bless this annihilation with a laugh.  He looks over 
or through their words to their writers, as he imagines them
41
: profoundly humble, genuinely 
suffering, terribly real” (120, emphasis mine).  For Miss Lonelyhearts, the very participation in 
Shrike‟s game has shaped his consciousness towards a recognition of the need to move beyond 
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 Even ethics and ethical consciousness can be uncompromisingly “violent” towards the other.  In desiring moral 
responsibility, Miss Lonelyhearts “imagines” his readers – perhaps a move by West to gesture at the ultimate 
impossibility of the ego escaping the desire for concept and form. 
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laughter to a sincere visualization of a suffering public.  Furthermore, his participation in 
Shrikean wit has made it impossible for him to approach the other without the sense of a 
relentlessly persecuting guilt; the fact that Miss Lonelyhearts recognizes his participation within 
his egoist enjoyment causes him agonizing pause to consider the manner in which he has 
formerly effaced his fellows and shared in their erasure.  In “Letters and Spirit in Miss 
Lonelyhearts,” Mark Conroy argues that “it is his complicity in the initial exploitation that keeps 
Miss Lonelyhearts from really fusing with his readers; true, he suffers as his readers do, but for 
him suffering is indissociable from guilt.”  Conroy continues, claiming, “The readers are 
unknowing victims, but the columnist is knowing: a party to his own exploitation, and to the 
same extent, that of his readers” (11).  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering, then, is not merely the 
product of his guilt, but, instead, is his guilt in-and-of-itself. 
 Within this pause, within this moment of writer‟s block (which he will experience quite 
frequently throughout the novel), Miss Lonelyhearts experiences his own guilt and shame for the 
participation in an egoist enjoyment that has defaced the other who addresses him through the 
letters.  A breakdown in language and cognition, his writer‟s block has taken him to an 
experience of moral conscience, which, as Levinas suggests, is the consciousness of an ethical 
subjectivity no longer satisfied with its self-insularity and its refusal of responsibility.  For 
Levinas, the guilt experienced by ethical subjectivity intimates the presence of the other, the 
claims of moral obligation always already present within selfhood.  And for West as well, the 
guilt suffered by Miss Lonelyhearts in his own participation in the annihilation of his readership 
directs him towards the claims of an other that is, that demands, and cannot be ignored any 
longer.  Perhaps the greatest leap of faith taken by the advice columnist, his initial experience of 
shame acknowledges both an awareness of the authentic demands of suffering individuals and 
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the commitment to a taking-responsibility that is astutely cognizant of its own inadequacies.  
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ writer‟s block is a guilt that cannot be assuaged, and, as such, is the 
experience of an ethical responsibility very much aware of the inadequacies of language and the 
mawkish commercialization of sympathy.  He understands the newspaper game for what it is – a 
simple rhetorical posturing and non-involvement – and realizes the inauthenticity of the language 
of suffering and mass-publicity. 
 As I have discussed in great detail above, the conventions of rhetorical-publicity under 
the capitalist culture of the 1930s necessitates a language of sympathetic identification in order to 
cohere a public that is composed of vastly disparate parts – that is, the language of sentimental 
affect envisions a public solidarity and morality through the affective overcoming of difference.  
This rhetoric of sentimentality, at least as it appears in the language of the newspaper and mass 
media, consumes the particularity of individuals and the ethical relationship within a universalist 
narrative of suffering and affective kinship.  “[W]hile each letter-writer‟s pain in Miss 
Lonelyhearts is „singular‟ and material in its extreme physicality…,” writes Nieland, “these pains 
are only legible through the specific conventions of the advice column to which the sufferers 
submit.”  This social discourse of mass-publicity, as Nieland continues, “subjects access through 
processes of self-abstraction and disembodiment – the signatories assume names like „Desperate‟ 
and „Broad Shoulders,‟ abandon their marked particularity and effectively name their typicality,” 
thus oscillating between “affective particularity and embracing putative universals” (68).  
Modern mass-publicity, as such, mediates the particular through a public language of default 
sentimentality inadequate to the task of Westian ethical responsibility; this discourse can only 
universalize, pervert, and defer object-particularity.  It is this very sentimental discourse, 
characterized by Barnard as “a kind of pseudo-spiritual feel-good poetry” (53), which Miss 
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Lonelyhearts must continually struggle against and to which he must, unfortunately, continually 
revert.  Additionally, his struggle against sentimentality extends to a broader struggle with 
language-in-itself (that is, language as a structure and system) as well; the institution of language 
is posited as essentially bankrupt and sterile by the novel – Miss Lonelyhearts struggles to find 
the words to express both his moral sincerity and the reality of ethical experience.  As Duncan 
claims, the text of Miss Lonelyhearts “depicts language as radically false, a fundamentally 
misleading order of being, or nonbeing, as the case may be” (122).
42
  According to West, 
language makes the world and does not necessarily correspond with the world as it exists in 
reality. 
In this sense, language itself becomes an irony that presents its words as correspondent 
with reality, as capable of negotiating metaphysico-epistemological certainty while it 
simultaneously severs human beings from the reality it would wish to represent, thus staking its 
claims, interestingly, with a Shrikean world of irony that refuses the possibility of substance and 
meaning.  Language, as nothing but irony, as that which belongs to Shrike, simply constructs an 
illusory reality that pokes holes in the desire for an authentically meaningful world.  Language, 
like Shrike, devours the suffering of real individuals and challenges the adequacy of ethical 
response, thereby perverting the ethical into nothing but the aesthetic (this is particularly relevant 
to both the language of Shrikean mockery and that of sentimentalism).  “[B]y moving the 
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 Duncan argues that Miss Lonelyhearts‟ realization of the inadequacy of words results in his fleeing from the 
inarticulacy of language into the epistemological foundation of deity, of Logos: 
[I]t seems to mean a flight from words in and of themselves to that only (as he sees it) which can 
redeem them, put them in their proper place – a flight from the terrible logic of Shrike to the 
Logos itself, Christ, the Word made flesh.  The Word informs flesh, flesh substantiates the Word: 
reality then carries a life-time guarantee, its value insured by language. (121) 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ intention, then, is to reanimate his social world through the Archimedean stability of a language 
articulated through the Word, a presence that ensures both the possibility and the presence of truth and metaphysical 
certainty. 
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question of suffering from a moral to an aesthetic register,” writes Greenberg, “he [Shrike] 
allows us to take pleasure in the verbal presentation of an otherwise painful situation.  Miss 
Lonelyhearts, won over by Shrike‟s masterful performances, has therefore become an ironist as 
well,” doubtful of “final vocabularies….  But whereas Shrike seems confident in his ironism, 
Lonelyhearts longs for something pre- or extra-rhetorical” (595).  Although he constantly falls 
back into the trap of linguistic irony and consistently reverts to its meretricious display of words 
and concepts, it is clear that Miss Lonelyhearts desires to move beyond both the formulaic 
rhetoric of sentimentalism and the ironic emptying of the world as invoked in Shrike and in 
language itself.  He realizes the dangers and inadequacies of any form of language (particularly 
that of sentimentalism) in its consumption of the individual sufferer – the real – into a universal 
narrative of emptiness.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ writer‟s block, then, exposes the drive towards the 
annihilation of the other present in language as well as present in the self; writer‟s block points 
the reader towards the potential of an ethical desire that moves beyond the reductive quality of a 
disembodied community composed through language by actually taking up the moral claims 
made by the other.  This pursuit takes him to the undeniable particularity of flesh, of the face that 
emanates from the other. 
 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ physical encountering of his readers is a necessity for West.  By invoking the 
presence of an other that exists in his radical materiality and cannot be so simply dissimulated 
through words, West challenges his protagonist‟s ethical capacity.  Though – as West suggests 
through the initial experience of writer‟s block – the letters place the same moral claims upon 
Miss Lonelyhearts, the flesh, however, makes claims that can‟t be as easily ignored by the 
subject as those conveyed through disembodied words.  The experience, then, of the public in its 
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overwhelming “fleshiness,” in its grotesque particularity, as West portrays it, takes Miss 
Lonelyhearts to the tumultuous, supererogatory depths of ethical obligation, as well as exposes 
the self as burdened by an other whose alterity challenges the concept and form of language‟s 
universalist impulse and interrogates the limits of ethical language.  When encountered by the 
materiality of his readership, we witness the revelation of an other that upsets Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
capacity to act ethically responsible; furthermore, we watch a Miss Lonelyhearts that is 
completely unraveled by these encounters and made “dangerously” uncomfortable. 
It is no secret, however, that Miss Lonelyhearts is indubitably more at ease with his 
readers as abstractions rather than materially manifest.  The abstract, as he is well aware, is much 
more manageable – its needs can be addressed and satiated.  “Lonelyhearts is much more 
comfortable with abstractions than material particularities,” suggests Nieland, “and this becomes 
laughably obvious in the slapstick confrontations with the body of his readership, which he” 
frequently understands “as obscene materializations of his letters, physical manifestations of 
suffering that remain maddeningly unknowable” (70).  So, for instance, when he meets Fay 
Doyle for the first time, he is overwhelmed, as Nieland points out, “by her corporeal thingliness” 
(70).  Not only are Mrs. Doyle‟s voluptuous ham hocks overbearing upon Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
conceptual understanding, but Betty also bombards his abilities to retreat into the familiarity of 
form.  Thinking that Betty is laughing at him in the “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Fat Thumb” (an 
especially revealing title) episode, Miss Lonelyhearts searches her actions and face for signs of 
cultural familiarity: 
On the defense, he examined her laugh for “bitterness,” “sour-grapes,” “a-broken-
heart,” “the devil-may-care.”  But to his confusion, he found nothing at which to 
laugh back.  Her smile had opened naturally, not like an umbrella, and while he 
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watched her laugh folded and became a smile again, a smile that was neither 
“wry,” “ironical” nor “mysterious.” (71) 
Miss Lonelyhearts finds himself incapable of abstracting Betty‟s otherness into the same, 
incapable of narrating her through the universalist conventions of mass culture and rhetorical-
publicity.  Significantly, the illusory distance formerly instantiated by Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
linguistic and sympathetic abstracting of his correspondents constructs an image of the ego 
deluded in its mastery – that is, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ former capabilities of curtailing and 
controlling alterity through the conceptual work of the Levinasian ego veil his egoist work from 
exposure as mere subjective dalliance and impuissance.  However, corporeal particularity‟s 
frustration of concept and of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ abilities to manipulate form causes considerable 
damage to his egoist mastery and reveals the ego as essentially powerless to actually abstain 
itself from the particular and ethical responsibility.  As I have claimed previously, Miss 
Lonelyhearts is – even provided his frequent delusion and ethical inadequacies – made acutely 
aware of this.  Though his proclivity for abstraction demonstrates a discomfort with the 
particular, nonetheless, Miss Lonelyhearts does want – indeed, seems to need – the encounter 
with flesh, the corporeally particular; only through this confrontation with the face (now 
physically expressed as a finite manifestation of the Infinite), which expresses beyond form, can 
he hope to possibly fulfill his ethical responsibility. 
In his encounter with the Doyles in “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Cripple” and “Miss 
Lonelyhearts Pays a Visit,” Miss Lonelyhearts has one of his most violent (both literally and 
figuratively) confrontations in the entire novel, which takes him out of the comfort of the chez 
soi and exposes the ethical imperatives demanded by the revelation of the face.  As Lawrence W. 
DiStasi writes of this confrontation in “Aggression in Miss Lonelyhearts: Nowhere to Throw the 
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Stone,” “Here the normally tenuous and distilled contact one would expect, and which in fact 
Miss Lonelyhearts did expect, is breached and replaced by the total physical and spiritual 
involvement delineated in the novel” (84).  Sitting in Delehanty‟s, along with the rest of the 
newspaper gang, Miss Lonelyhearts is power-tripping off of yet another wave of moral egoism – 
so much, in fact, that his humility frightens Goldsmith, who “almost suggested a doctor” (108).  
So captivated by his own humility, Miss Lonelyhearts becomes immunized to an additional 
round of Shrike‟s ironic diffidence, to the editor‟s pretense of piety that only serves to condemn 
such religious fervency.  At this point, however, Miss Lonelyhearts and the others are 
approached by a diminutive cripple, Peter Doyle, whom Miss Lonelyhearts has never seen 
before.  Both Miss Lonelyhearts and his cohort view Doyle as a pathetic form of humanity, a 
grotesque manifestation of the reading public: “He [Doyle] used a cane and dragged one of his 
feet behind him in a box-shaped shoe with a four-inch sole.  As he hobbled along, he made many 
waste motions, like those of a partially destroyed insect” (109).  For Shrike, Doyle exists merely 
as a means towards furthering his game of mockery; while Doyle attempts to ingratiate himself 
as a comrade-in-arms, Shrike simply sees him as fodder for victimization.  Once it becomes 
obvious, though, that Doyle is not reducible to pathetic humanity, that he does indeed have the 
ability to jokingly dabble as his ironically eloquent interlocutor (Doyle, the meter man, jests that 
it is the “meter inspectors” of the world that have assumed “the place of the iceman in the 
stories” [109]), Shrike storms away, denied his game.  Whereas Shrike reads Doyle‟s wretched 
physical state as the stuff of ironic play, Miss Lonelyhearts construes the pathetic cripple as the 
stuff of sympathy and pity.   
Doyle‟s grotesque corporeality is admittedly hard for Miss Lonelyhearts to stomach; in 
fact, his instinctive reaction towards Doyle is that of revulsion.  Here, a great test of his humility 
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has been presented to the pious Miss Lonelyhearts, who must overcome his repugnance for 
Doyle in order to fulfill his moral quest.  As such, Miss Lonelyhearts initially attempts to 
negotiate, to work around, Doyle‟s otherness through the act of sympathetic identification.  
Immediately after Shrike‟s self-dismissal from the usual fare of empty bar conversation, Doyle 
turns to Miss Lonelyhearts, perplexed and agitated: 
The cripple was confused and angry.  “Your friend is a nut,” he said.  Miss 
Lonelyhearts was still smiling, but the character of his smile had changed.  It had 
become full of sympathy and a little sad. 
The new smile was for Doyle and he knew it.  He smiled back gratefully. 
(109-10, emphasis mine)  
Pitying Doyle for the pathetic piece of humanity that he is, Miss Lonelyhearts sticks around the 
bar, hoping to offer the cripple the possibility of camaraderie.  Though Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
sympathy may be somewhat touching on a purely emotional level, West makes it unquestionably 
clear that Miss Lonelyhearts, contrary to his opinions of himself, has not humbled his ego.  
According to Light, the barrier to actualizing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-solution is his pride.  
“Its [pride] simplest manifestation,” he states, “is in man‟s revulsion from his fellow man, his 
unwillingness to lick lepers….  Though Miss Lonelyhearts „wants to lick lepers‟…, he finds it 
difficult to attain sufficient humility.  Rather than uniting himself to the unfortunate, he pities 
them” (92).  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ sympathy does not involve him with Doyle; rather, his pity 
implies distance and condescension – precisely the game of the newspaper business which he 
repeatedly attempts to abdicate.   
 Soon, Doyle informs Miss Lonelyhearts of his wife‟s intentions to have the columnist 
over for dinner that evening.  “Miss Lonelyhearts was busy with his smile,” claims the narrator, 
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“and accepted without thinking of the evening he had spent with Mrs. Doyle.  The cripple felt 
honored and shook hands for a third time.  It was evidently his only social gesture” (110).  At 
this point, the two retreat to the back room, where they find a table to sit with one another.  
Something unique happens to the columnist‟s great-hearted ego here – Miss Lonelyhearts‟ self-
mastery begins to unravel, tossing him down into a world of chaos and confusion.  He sits staring 
into Doyle‟s face: 
The cripple had a very strange face.  His eyes failed to balance; his mouth 
was not under his nose; his forehead was square and bony; and his round chin was 
like a forehead in miniature.  He looked like one of those composite photographs 
used by screen magazines in guessing contests. (110) 
He cannot appropriate Doyle here; he is unable to abstract his face into an order and framework 
that befits his subjective world and understanding.  Something about Doyle‟s grotesque 
particularity, his radical otherness, is unsettling to Miss Lonelyhearts: 
They sat staring at each other until the strain of wordless communication 
began to excite them both.  Doyle made vague, needless adjustments to his 
clothing.  Miss Lonelyhearts found it very difficult to keep his smile steady. 
When the cripple finally labored into speech, Miss Lonelyhearts was 
unable to understand him.  He listened hard for a few minutes and realized that 
Doyle was making no attempt to be understood.  He was giving birth to groups of 
words that lived inside of him as things, a jumble of the retorts he had meant to 
make when insulted and the private curses against fate that experience had taught 
him to swallow. (110, emphasis mine) 
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Two very revealing occurrences take place within this passage.  For one, we witness Miss 
Lonelyhearts being made extremely uncomfortable.  Both Doyle‟s face and the emotional and 
cognitive toll of proximity and involvement begin to unsettle him, withering away the familiarity 
and comfort of the self; the chez soi is becoming strange, and this vulnerability does not belong 
to Miss Lonelyhearts alone.  Doyle also becomes vulnerable in this scene; his “giving birth to…a 
jumble of…retorts” reveals Doyle, reveals his ugliness and his nakedness before the presence of 
Miss Lonelyhearts.  Just as the Levinasian self is denuded and revealed, so too does Doyle spill 
forth his guts, challenging Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ability to flee into the comfort of understanding 
and familiarity.   
 What Miss Lonelyhearts has just experienced is the revelation of the face before which he 
possesses no precedence – that is, he possesses no knowledge, no concept, no pretension to 
understanding that may assist him in confronting Doyle.  As Levinas suggests, in his rather 
ambiguous way, the face does not only belong to the Infinite in its infinity, but also expresses the 
Infinite as a finite manifestation.  The face is beyond flesh and beyond finite comprehension and 
delimitation, but it also reinstates the other‟s materiality (the other is both Infinite and flesh).  For 
both Levinas and West, the other‟s corporeal particularity serves as an expression of suffering; 
when West portrays Doyle‟s physical and emotional states as repugnantly grotesque, he 
emphasizes the “grotesque” nature of both subjectivity and ethics.  Doyle‟s grotesque 
corporeality mirrors the absolute grotesqueness of ethical response and experience – ethics is 
gut-wrenching, intolerable, and anything but pleasant.  Just as Miss Lonelyhearts‟ experience of 
viewing Doyle is one of revulsion, so also is the experience of ethics, which cannot be avoided 
much like Doyle‟s repulsive mug – both are uncompromisingly disturbing and unsettling.  For 
Levinas, as well, ethical experience and ethical subjectivity can be described, perhaps even 
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reductively, as grotesque.  As Levinas posits, the face goes beyond any capacity I possess 
towards understanding or alleviating its pain and suffering.  The face roots the I up out of its 
familiarity and self-interiority and takes it to a mystifying, nebulous locus that transcends the 
desire for comfort and satiation.  Ethics is a taking of the bread out of one‟s own mouth for the 
other, to the point of infinite self-deprivation, and even this is not enough.  As such, we may 
justifiably ask how we might ever be able to respond appropriately to the other.  How can we 
ever mitigate the other‟s suffering?  How can we possibly answer that suffering in a manner 
capable of satisfying his or her ethical claims upon us?  As Miss Lonelyhearts soon experiences, 
the answer to these questions is not readily available, if it is at all, and the other‟s suffering is not 
so easily assuaged. 
 Turning, once again, to the encounter between Miss Lonelyhearts and Doyle at 
Delehanty‟s, immediately after Doyle‟s muttered series of utterances, he takes out a letter he has 
written to Miss Lonelyhearts.  Initially, at this point, we seem to be right back in familiar 
territory once again; however, something about Doyle‟s letter is uniquely different from that of 
the other correspondents.  Not only does he reveal it to Miss Lonelyhearts in person, but the 
letter is also signed “Peter Doyle,” without anonymity.  Attempting to rearticulate Doyle‟s 
particularity, the letter also posits an honest inquiry, not concerning what actions one should take 
in order to alleviate his or her suffering, but, instead, asking what the value of suffering is all 
about: 
“What I want to no is what in hell is the use day after day with a foot like mine 
when you have to go around pulling and scrambling for a lousy three squares 
with a toothache in it that comes from using the foot so much.  The doctor told me 
I ought to rest it for six months but who will pay me when I am resting it.  But that 
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aint what I mean either because you might tell me to change my job and where 
could I get another one I am lucky to have one at all.  It aint the job that I am 
complaining about but what I want to no is what is the whole stinking business 
for.” (111) 
Doyle sincerely inquires about life and his position within the world – one of insufferable pain 
and intransigent dissatisfaction.  As John Keyes argues in “„Inarticulate Expressions of Genuine 
Suffering?‟: A Reply to the Correspondence in Miss Lonelyhearts,” Doyle‟s letter is different in 
that it doesn‟t search for solutions to his personal predicaments or the alleviation of suffering; 
instead, it is a sincere desire for existential value.  According to Keyes, “Doyle is not searching 
for solutions – economic, political, domestic – he is asking Miss Lonelyhearts „what is the whole 
stinking business for.‟  The focus is existential” (20).  Here, Doyle becomes human for Miss 
Lonelyhearts and for West‟s reader.  Additionally, as Miss Lonelyhearts sits in his presence, 
“puzzling out the crabbed writing” (111), he takes a step towards real humility, overcoming his 
revulsion for Doyle: 
Doyle‟s damp hand accidentally touched his under the table.  He jerked away, but 
then drove his hand back and forced it to clasp the cripple‟s.  After finishing the 
letter, he did not let go, but pressed it firmly with all the love he could manage.  
At first the cripple covered his embarrassment by disguising the meaning of the 
clasp with a handshake, but he soon gave in to it and they sat silently, hand in 
hand. (111-12) 
For Miss Lonelyhearts, the experience of ethical desire has moved him out of his self-
complacency and comfort towards the other.  He has humbled his ego through the experience of 
suffering. 
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 If Miss Lonelyhearts has indeed humbled his ego here, then this humility is extremely 
short-lived.  The two leave the speakeasy together, “both very drunk and very busy: Doyle with 
the wrongs he had suffered and Miss Lonelyhearts with the triumphant thing that his humility 
had become” (113).  The irony does not escape us.  Miss Lonelyhearts is taking egotistical pride 
and pleasure in supposedly not being egotistical, moral pride in not being immoral; however, his 
“ethical” satisfaction will soon be disrupted and turned upside-down.  Once he and Doyle enter 
the latter‟s apartment and prepare for dinner, Miss Lonelyhearts sits quietly at the dinner table –  
Faye‟s wonderingly flirtatious kneecap at work upon him underneath – attempting to recover the 
sensation he had experienced in touching Doyle back at Delehanty‟s.  He cannot, however, and 
this seems to trouble him greatly.  His only manner of responding to this disturbance is to search 
for a message, a special meaning he can bestow upon the lives of Doyle and his wife: “Miss 
Lonelyhearts made no attempt to be sociable.  He was busy trying to find a message.  When he 
did speak it would have to be in the form of a message” (114).  However, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
sense of the seriousness of the situation he currently finds himself placed into is balked by both 
Faye‟s provocative flirtation and the Doyles‟ utter self-degradation.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire 
for piety and humility is challenged by the Doyles‟ actions; his piety and sincerity are parodied 
by their games, and he cannot be taken seriously as he desires: 
The cripple started a sigh that ended in a groan and then, as though 
ashamed of himself, said, “Ain‟t I the pimp, to bring home a guy for my wife?”  
He darted a quick look at Miss Lonelyhearts and laughed apologetically. 
Mrs. Doyle was furious.  She rolled a newspaper into a club and struck her 
husband on the mouth with it.  He surprised her by playing the fool.  He growled 
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like a dog and caught the paper in his teeth.  When she let go of her end, he 
dropped to his hands and knees and continued the imitation on the floor. 
Miss Lonelyhearts tried to get the cripple to stand up and bent to lift him; 
but, as he did so, Doyle tore open Miss Lonelyhearts‟ fly, then rolled over on his 
back, laughing wildly. (114) 
Recovering, Miss Lonelyhearts once again pursues the obtainment of his message.  Realizing 
that he must say something and say it now, he stands up not knowing what will pour out of him: 
“He had not yet found his message, but he had to say something.  „Please don‟t fight,‟ he 
pleaded.  „He loves you, Mrs. Doyle; that‟s why he acts like that.  Be kind to him‟” (114-15, 
emphasis mine).  Once again strained by the tax of writer‟s block, Miss Lonelyhearts delivers 
what seems to be a sincere linguistic response.  He does not know what to say, he does not 
formulate a “message,” thereby perverting the current situation into nothing but a mere 
manifestation of the letters and the language of sentimentality.  Rather, his cognitive instability 
actually does something here; Miss Lonelyhearts actually speaks to the other – he is saying 
rather than participating in the said.   
 Unfortunately, as in the experience of humility, the experience of ethical response is only 
ephemeral and evanescent.  After speaking, Miss Lonelyhearts approaches Doyle and clasps 
hands with him, and the two stand together, “smiling and holding hands, until Mrs. Doyle 
reentered the room” (115).  Making light of the embrace, she mockingly attempts to implicate 
the two within a mutual homosexual desire.  Infuriated by his wife‟s defamations, Doyle 
positions himself threateningly, making as if he will strike her.  Now, the situation has went 
entirely too far, and Miss Lonelyhearts knows that he must once again do something to assuage 
the personal antagonisms between Doyle and his wife: 
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Miss Lonelyhearts realized that now was the time to give his message.  It was now 
or never. 
 “You have a big, strong body, Mrs. Doyle.  Holding your husband in your 
arms, you can warm him and give him life.  You can take the chill out of his 
bones.  He drags his days out in areaways and cellars, carrying a heavy load of 
weariness and pain.  You can substitute a dream of yourself for this load.  A 
buoyant dream that will be like a dynamo in him.  You can do this by letting him 
conquer you in your bed.  He will repay you by flowering and becoming ardent 
over you…” (115, emphasis mine) 
Aware of the failure of his “message,” aware of the language of mass-publicity creeping its way 
in, Miss Lonelyhearts instead searches for another route: 
 With the first few words Miss Lonelyhearts had known that he would be 
ridiculous.  By avoiding God, he had failed to tap the force in his heart and had 
merely written a column for his paper. 
 He tried again by becoming hysterical.  “Christ is love,” he screamed at 
them.  It was a stage scream, but he kept on.  “Christ is the black fruit that hangs 
on the crosstree.  Man was lost by eating of the forbidden fruit.  He shall be saved 
by eating of the bidden fruit.  The black Christ-fruit, the love fruit…” 
 This time he had failed still more miserably.  He had substituted the 
rhetoric of Shrike for that of Miss Lonelyhearts.  He felt like an empty bottle, 
shiny and sterile. (115, emphasis mine) 
Before spilling forth “the rhetoric of…Miss Lonelyhearts,” the advice columnist knows that he 
has already gotten it wrong; he has found his “message,” but it is nothing but the empty rhetoric 
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of the advice column and of evangelical hystericism.  In telling the Doyles to become ardent and 
flower, he has merely giving himself over to Shrikean irony once again.  In telling them about 
the “bidden fruit” of Christ that heals, he has merely sunk into the language of hysterical piety.  
At this point, West asks his reader: is empty rhetoric even avoidable?  Even when attempting the 
sincere, we sink into the pretentious.
43
  Nonetheless, West makes us aware here that Miss 
Lonelyhearts has indeed been hurt by the incident – that is, his inability to adequately respond to 
his fellows empties him out: “He felt like an empty bottle, shiny and sterile.” 
 After Doyle leaves to go and purchase a bottle of gin, Faye once more takes up her game 
with Miss Lonelyhearts, attempting to obtain his services in bed again.  She makes several 
advancements towards him, confident in her abilities to ingratiate herself and seduce him.  
Frustrated by the inadequacy of his “ethical” response, Miss Lonelyhearts will have none of it.  
Instead, he lashes out at her violently.  “He struck out blindly and hit her in the face,” the 
narrator states, “She screamed and he hit her again and again.  He kept hitting her until she 
stopped trying to hold him, then he ran out of the house” (116).  Here, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical 
impulse is severely complicated further – by attempting to avoid adultery and sin, he resorts to 
violence.  Ethical frustration leads to yet another ethical frustration.  Indeed, ethics isn‟t fair (as 
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 The tension between actually involved dialogue and distanced rhetoric is never lost within the text.  Several critics 
have noted how this tension shapes many of the novel‟s incidents as well as shapes our understanding of the world 
that these characters inhabit.  Duncan reads a Miss Lonelyhearts that is constantly battered by speeches rather than 
linguistic sincerity: 
Miss Lonelyhearts deals primarily not with people, but with letters, with various orders and 
disorders of words.  In his personal relations he is not engaged in dialogue, the language of 
spontaneous give and take, nearly so much as he is confronted with speeches, with words as 
deliberately composed as those of the letters, if not more so. (117) 
And Miss Lonelyhearts is not capable of abstaining from this rhetorical practice and posture as well.  Indeed, he 
does not seem capable of ever fully escaping this linguistic malaise as he constantly reverts to speech-making 
himself.   
 Furthermore, this expressive predicament permeates the entire Westian world.  As Barnard claims, the 
masses lack any sense of dialogic function and expressive potential.  She points towards the zombie-esque crowds of 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “dreamlike violence” sequence.  According to Barnard, “„[T]he zombie-like crowds…have torn 
mouths,‟ a symbolic detail emphasizing the alienation of the masses even from any expressive capacity” (49). 
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Levinas claims), but even more significantly, what we have with Miss Lonelyhearts‟ violent 
reaction is an escape back into the egoist enjoyment of the self.  Finding the unavoidable, gut-
wrenching, and grotesque nature of ethical experience too much to bear, Miss Lonelyhearts, 
instead, flees his inadequacies and ethical trauma by resorting to a coping mechanism.  The 
suffering of his correspondents is overwhelming, so he lunges outward in order to counteract the 
pain of his burden.  What we are left with, then, at the end of these two chapters, is a Miss 
Lonelyhearts who struggles with his moral pride, is unable to put ethics into language and action, 
and cannot escape both the other‟s and morality‟s persecution.  As West suggests through Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical frustration, we may deal with the imperatives of ethics by pursuing one of 
two options: coping – that is, ignoring the commands of the other – or embracing the trauma, 
embracing the traumatism of ethical experience. 
 
In Miss Lonelyhearts, the capacity to cope is exactly what can be fulfilled – it is simple and easy.  
Ethics, on the other hand, is not.  Not only does Miss Lonelyhearts find an outlet for his 
frustration through violence, he also finds other coping strategies through his moral pride and his 
physical withdrawals back into his room.
44
  Taking his Christ-solution cue from Dostoyevsky‟s 
Father Zossima‟s “„all-embracing love‟” (67), Miss Lonelyhearts perverts the message and 
power of divine love into an egoistic aggrandizement: “It was excellent advice.  If he followed it, 
he would be a big success.  His column would be syndicated and the whole world would learn to 
love.  The Kingdom of Heaven would arrive.  He would sit on the right hand of the Lamb” (67).  
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ego doesn‟t just parry real humility; it also acts as a protective distance and 
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 We may view the sentimentalist community of the letters as another strategy of coping.  Within this community, 
solutions – especially formulaic ones – to suffering are readily available.  As West claims, a community predicated 
upon affective formulae does nothing towards actually solving and alleviating suffering (which is, after all, 
insatiable). 
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non-involvement that is constantly lurking within the subtext of his encounters and is there for 
him to fall back into.  Construing himself as a divine messenger of the Word of God, he 
separates himself from both the God that he would serve and from the world of others.  
Additionally, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ retreats into the “sanctity” and peace of his apartment help him 
counter the overwhelming nature of interactive involvement.  For St. Clair, “Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
withdrawal is paradoxically most nearly complete and most communally and spiritually 
productive when he takes to his bed to recover from the shocks of the world.”  She continues by 
claiming that “[h]ere he is free to imagine order, to dream in the living symbols of mythic 
imagination, to assume a measure of mastery and control over the chaotic elements that threaten 
to erode the respect he is determined to accord the human experience” (158).  While St. Clair 
reads his withdrawals from the outside world as ethically productive, Miss Lonelyhearts can 
instead be viewed as attempting to escape the pressures of social involvement and ethical 
responsibility when he takes to his bed, isolating himself within his room.  The control and order 
he is able to establish from his bed is merely illusion – another attempt of the self to appropriate 
the world and construct exteriority as the self‟s extension.
45
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 West absolutely refuses to allow Miss Lonelyhearts to relish in the enjoyment of his egoist mastery.  Not only 
does the suffering of the other dissolve his promiscuous freedom, but the physical world of objects itself 
deconstructs his attainment of subjective mastery and his capability of totalizing experience.  In “Miss Lonelyhearts 
and the Fat Thumb,” for instance, we find the advice columnist “developing an almost insane sensitiveness to order” 
(70).  However, the material world debars its appropriation: 
For a little while, he seemed to hold his own but one day he found himself with his back 
to the wall.  On that day all the inanimate things over which he had tried to obtain control took the 
field against him….   
He fled to the street, but there chaos was multiple.  Broken groups of people hurried past, 
forming neither stars nor squares.  The lamp-posts were badly spaced and the flagging was of 
different sizes.  Nor could he do anything with the harsh clanging sound of street cars and the raw 
shouts of hucksters…. 
   He stood quietly against a wall, trying not to see or hear. (70)    
Miss Lonelyhearts is utterly powerless in his attempts to categorize, formulize, and arrange both experience and the 
world; his desire to make the external world into an extension of self is denied.  As West suggests here, the self in its 
freedom, the self “trying not to see or hear,” is a self that is coping with experience and the reality of ethical 
demands. 
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Significantly, the resort to coping is not endemic to Miss Lonelyhearts alone.  Shrike, for 
instance, finds therapeutic solace in the comforts of his ironism, which determines the dictates of 
his worldview and existential outlook.  In “Nathanael West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts,” Beverly Jones 
describes Shrike‟s ironic cynicism as what essentially boils down to a systematic order of 
nihilism: 
As the modernist antihero, Shrike has his own system of order to shore 
against ruin, an uncompromising cynicism made all the more impenetrable by the 
fact that there is nothing arcane about its major tenet.  There is no meaning in 
anything, especially suffering, and there is no escape from it in this or any other 
life. (197) 
Shrike‟s irony, then, ensures him against the inhospitality of a world that refuses value and 
meaning because this worldview negates the very possibility of significance in the first place; he 
abstains from the whole chaotic mess of attempting to make life purposeful.
46
  Whereas Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ religiosity, according to Jones, is to be viewed as hypocritical and hysterical 
(which, she claims, is exposed by Shrike‟s observations), leading only to violence, death, and 
disorder in the end, Shrike‟s ironic cynicism allows him to function in a disenchanted world and 
makes him an agent of an unassailable order and stability (196).  However, Shrike‟s ironic 
distance separates him from intersubjective involvement, deflecting the possibility of personal 
and intimate attachments and thereby delimiting the enormity of suffering.  Shrike resides within 
a “promiscuous freedom” that takes no responsibility for itself, and, most crucially, takes no 
responsibility for others.  By ignoring and negating any signs of involvement with others, Shrike 
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 What Jones‟ account fails to consider, however, is the manner in which the escape from the enchantment of the 
world is essentially impossible – that is, even the claim to the dismissal of value is indeed a value claim.  Even the 
most ironic and cynical of all nihilists have their values.  One might argue in Jones‟ favor, though, that Shrike‟s 
ironic stance realizes the “irony” of its own claim and accepts this paradox of value. 
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is capable of hiding within himself and wielding an illusory mastery over the world, which 
makes living, for him, as easy as he can possibly achieve. 
 While Shrike hides in his ironic cynicism, Betty escapes the actual world through an 
idealistic – and very clichéd – treatment of nature and rural life.  Her utopian “bucolicism” 
imagines the natural countryside as a therapeutic agent, capable of restoring both physical and 
emotional health and capable of revitalizing life forms.  As Conroy states, “Betty has already 
made a cliché of nature, one which has been parodied by Shrike.  Nature as an imagined scene of 
plenitude is a figure of cultural fantasy” (15).  Betty‟s delimited world is one of idealistic (and 
idyllic) cultural production – the rustic as the site where all pain and concerns, things associated 
with the rat race of city life, disappear and are vanquished.  Indeed, Betty‟s naïve innocence 
negates the real world and the real suffering of other individuals.  According to Betty, things like 
violence and suffering can be cured not only by trips to the countryside but also by conventional 
medicine.  Attributing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ psychosomatic malaise to urban life, she attempts to 
recuperate and heal him through a therapeutic process that involves swimming in ponds in rural 
Connecticut, eating warm soup, and swallowing down aspirin.  Miss Lonelyhearts tells her, 
“„Wife-torturers, rapers of small children, according to you they‟re all sick.  No morality, only 
medicine.  Well, I‟m not sick.  I don‟t need any of your damned aspirin.  I‟ve got a Christ 
complex.  Humanity…I‟m a humanity lover‟” (72).  Miss Lonelyhearts realizes that his illness is 
not sickness as Betty would define it; rather, the issue is much deeper and not one that modern 
medicine or utopian bucolicism can alleviate or solve.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ sickness traces its 
provenance to involvement in the world.  Betty, on the other hand, isolates herself from the lived 
world of emotional engagement and unmitigated suffering: “Her world was not the world and 
could never include the readers of his column.  Her sureness was based on the power to limit 
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experience arbitrarily.  Moreover, his confusion was significant, while her order was not” (71).  
Where the disorder and chaos of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ life posits the world as inexorably 
demanding and meaningful, Betty‟s escapist fantasizing of the world actually mystifies the value 
of experience and engaged involvement.  According to Light, “For Miss Lonelyhearts, Betty‟s 
order is a false one.  It excludes not only suffering but also the spiritual needs of man.  It 
degrades man to a mere body and assumes that all his ailments can be cured” (88).  And the cure 
is what cannot (nor should it) be found. 
 As West claims in Miss Lonelyhearts, the ethical subject must constantly negotiate 
between the annihilation of the lived world (the world of the other and the Infinite), involved in 
coping, and the embracing of ethical traumatism and ethical obsession.  For West, ethics is 
predicated upon the necessity of the self to overcome its desire for coping, and, instead, embrace 
the traumatic nature of ethical experience and subjectivity.  Ethics is not in coping, but, rather, it 
is in trauma.  As such, the ethical moment reveals itself when the self is most overwhelmed and 
most burdened by the other, who simply cannot be resisted or ignored.  Indeed, as both West and 
Levinas suggest, this experience is frightening and unsettling, taking the self to the very limits of 
subjective stability (in fact, disrupting this stability altogether), which is why coping appears to 
be so desirable.  Nonetheless, this burden placed upon the self by the other cannot be deflected 
through any process of subjective therapy – the claims of the other persecute the self always 
already and from all around.   
With Miss Lonelyhearts, we see that the desire for retreat often directly corresponds with 
the moment when he is most overwhelmed and traumatized by the other.  When he accompanies 
Mary Shrike to El Gaucho, Miss Lonelyhearts immediately becomes uncomfortable with the 
restaurant‟s invocation of celluloid cultural fantasy and commercialized homogeny: 
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But the romantic atmosphere only heightened his feeling of icy fatness.  
He tried to fight it by telling himself that it was childish.  What had happened to 
his great understanding heart?  Guitars, bright shawls, exotic foods, outlandish 
costumes – all these things were part of the business of dreams.  He had learned 
not to laugh at the advertisements offering to teach writing, cartooning, 
engineering, to add inches to the biceps and to develop the bust.  He should 
therefore realize that the people who came to El Gaucho were the same as those 
who wanted to write and live the life of an artist, wanted to be an engineer and 
wear leather puttees, wanted to develop a grip that would impress the boss, 
wanted to cushion Raoul‟s head on their swollen breasts.  They were the same 
people as those who wrote to Miss Lonelyhearts for help. (83) 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ refusal to laugh at these dreams and fantasies, as well as laugh at those who 
eat at El Gaucho, reveals his awareness of the horrific extent of both human suffering and 
emotional needs in the cultural landscape of twentieth-century America.  This ambience of 
suffering, as projected forth by El Gaucho‟s dream landscape, then, produces another wave of 
sickness for him.  While he is uncomfortable with this atmosphere, Mary, on the other hand, 
seems right at home within the protective fantasies of cultural escape and the dream industry of 
mass-marketing: 
“I like this place,” Mary said.  “It‟s a little fakey, I know, but it‟s gay and I 
so want to be gay.” 
She thanked him by offering herself in a series of formal, impersonal 
gestures.  She was wearing a tight, shiny dress that was like glass-covered steel 
and there was something cleanly mechanical in her pantomime. 
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“Why do you want to be gay?” 
“Every one wants to be gay – unless they‟re sick.” 
Was he sick?  In a great cold wave, the readers of his column crashed 
over the music, over the bright shawls and picturesque waiters, over her shining 
body.  To save himself, he asked to see the medal.  Like a little girl helping an old 
man to cross the street, she leaned over for him to look into the neck of her dress.  
(83-84, emphasis mine) 
Here, we see that Mary‟s desire to be “gay” is a desire for comfort and escape – the desire 
manifest in coping.  Miss Lonelyhearts seems aware of this and wonders if he is sick because he 
possesses an attraction towards being made uncomfortable (though this attraction is obviously 
ambivalent and often evanescent).  His correspondents are present in his conscience and “crash” 
over the objects of merriment garnishing the restaurant, emphasizing the self‟s inability to be 
made comfortable and to reside within its freedom and enjoyment (the protective space of the 
ego that copes) as well as suggesting the inability of the self to be made “gay” in the ethical 
relationship.
47
  For West, ethical conscience is like the experience of an illness, wherein the self 
cannot be made well and comfortable.  However, Miss Lonelyhearts simply is unable to fully 
come to terms with this realization, with the burden placed upon him by the other, and he thus 
attempts to save himself from this awareness by escaping to the spectacle of Mary‟s medal-
bedecked bosom, thereby ignoring both suffering and the other.   
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 According to West, to be “gay,” to be comfortable, is to ignore the ethical command of the other.  Revealingly, 
within this scene, Mary also relates the story of her mother‟s death from breast cancer and of her father‟s neglect: 
“„My mother died of cancer of the breast,‟ she said in a brave voice, like a little girl reciting at a party.  „She died 
leaning over a table.  My father was a portrait painter.  He led a very gay life.  He mistreated my mother‟” (85, 
emphasis mine). 
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 Nonetheless, the extent to which the other seems to be present in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
moral conscience presents a radical reevaluation of ethical experience and subjectivity.  In “Miss 
Lonelyhearts in the Dismal Swamp,” the advice columnist once again becomes physically sick 
and takes to his bed.  Soon, Betty begins visiting, bringing soup and chicken in order to nourish 
him back to health.  Significantly, it appears here as if he is so burdened by the other that his 
sickness is the symptom of ethical obligation: 
He knew that she believed he did not want to get well, yet he followed her 
instructions because he realized that his present sickness was unimportant.  It was 
merely a trick by his body to relieve one more profound. 
Whenever he mentioned the letters or Christ, she changed the subject to 
tell long stories about life on a farm.  She seemed to think that if he never talked 
about these things, his body would get well, that if his body got well everything 
would be well. (99) 
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ physical ailments translate into the moral ailments of ethical obligation and 
burden.  Indeed, his own suffering becomes directly invoked and produced through the other.  
Coming close to a Levinasian formulation of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering, Greenberg suggests 
that this suffering is “related to, amplified by, and perhaps even produced from the suffering of 
those around” him (594).  Like in sickness, where the agent of illness is outside yet penetrates 
the body‟s boundaries (it is both outside and inside) to exist and “traumatize” within, the other 
produces Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering and crashes upon his moral conscience.  He is absolutely 
unable to escape this suffering and incapable of disrupting the demands of ethical traumatism. 
 West‟s stress upon the production of the self‟s suffering as emanating from the other who 
is always already emphasizes the non-intentional nature of ethics.  In Miss Lonelyhearts, while 
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the self is certainly “free” to do whatever it pleases, ethical experience cannot, however, be 
chosen; rather, ethics chooses us and chooses subjectivity.  This directly links West with 
Levinasian ethical traumatism.  As Spargo notes, ethical sincerity and responsibility are, for 
Levinas, not equivalent with the subject‟s intentions; instead, these are anterior to the subject‟s 
choosing: 
Ethical sincerity does not designate the choice to abide by an obligation or to 
represent oneself straightforwardly or even to do what is best by the other….  
Denoted only as an inability to get out of the way of the other, Levinasian 
sincerity entails an absence of choice, the impossibility of beginning from any 
point other than the self as a site of vulnerability already signified as being-for-
the-other.  As soon as one joins sincerity to intention…, one introduces a 
symbolism that deflects the ethical meaning of the other. (97-98) 
For Levinas, the subject simply cannot intend itself towards the other as a commitment chosen 
out of its own autonomy.  The commitment towards the other is established, rather, by the other 
and infinity.  For this reason, then, subjectivity belongs to the traumatism of the other, and 
ethical responsibility persistently persecutes the self.  According to Levinas, responsibility is “a 
response answering to a non-thematizable provocation and thus a non-vocation, a trauma” (OB 
12).  “The-one-for-the-other” of responsibility is not commitment, which presupposes a 
consciousness that freely consents to come to the other (136-37).  Rather, responsibility and 
obligation are a giving-over of the self that persecutes the I and places an unbearable burden 
upon it.  Responsibility is a giving that is painful and supererogatory.  “To give, to-be-for-
another, despite oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself,” Levinas argues, “is to take the bread 
out of one‟s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one‟s own fasting” (OB 56).   
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Similarly, West realizes the necessity of embracing suffering and trauma, which is why 
his protagonist possesses a need for inviting suffering: “Turning back to his desk, he picked up a 
bulky letter in a dirty envelope.  He read it for the same reason that an animal tears at a wounded 
foot: to hurt the pain” (104).  If Miss Lonelyhearts is willing to embrace trauma, it is, 
nevertheless, an embrace that is both woefully inept and brief.  The novel‟s final chapters 
ultimately reveal the burden of ethical demands as essentially far too much for him to bear.  In 
“Miss Lonelyhearts and the Party Dress,” his ego has become larger than ever as he assumes his 
identification with “the rock.”  As “the rock,” he no longer feels the guilt of ethical demands: 
“He did not feel guilty.  He did not feel.  The rock was a solidification of his feeling, his 
conscience, his sense of reality, his self-knowledge” (123-24).  Furthermore, whereas the world 
of others previously resisted his proclivity towards abstraction, it now lends itself freely to this 
impulse as Miss Lonelyhearts abstracts both himself and Betty during the height of a serious 
confrontation concerning her pregnancy and their future together: 
  When she was quiet, he asked her to marry him. 
   “No,” she said.  “I‟m going to have an abortion.” 
 “Please marry me.”  He pleaded just as he had pleaded with her to have a 
soda. 
He begged the party dress to marry him, saying all the things it expected 
to hear, all the things that went with strawberry sodas and farms in Connecticut.  
He was just what the party dress wanted him to be: simple and sweet, whimsical 
and poetic, a trifle collegiate yet very masculine. (123) 
Reducing being, the other, and communicative action to concept and essence, Miss Lonelyhearts 
renounces the ethical desire invoked in saying and responsibility; he has become completely 
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comfortable within his freedom.  By the final chapter, “Miss Lonelyhearts Has a Religious 
Experience,” he is so isolated within his egoist enjoyment that he actually begins to project God 
– that is, he identifies with an image of God that conforms solely to his enlarged sense of self, he 
speaks God for God.  “He immediately began to plan a new life and his future conduct as Miss 
Lonelyhearts,” states the narrator, “He submitted drafts of his column to God and God approved 
them.  God approved his every thought” (123).  Thinking that God has sent Doyle to him so he 
can “perform a miracle and be certain of his conversion,” Miss Lonelyhearts negates Doyle‟s 
particularity by turning Doyle‟s shout into the voice of all his correspondents:  
He did not understand the cripple‟s shout and heard it as a cry for help from 
Desperate, Harold S., Catholic-mother, Broken-hearted, Broad-shoulders, Sick-of-
it-all, Disillusioned-with-tubercular-husband.  He was running to succor them 
with love. (126)  
In the end, Miss Lonelyhearts is incapable of breaking with the impulse towards abstraction 
present in subjective categorization and totality.  Absolute particularity necessitated by ethics 
reveals itself as absolutely impossible, and the “destructive” force of ethical obligation proves 
too demanding for the self. 
 Indeed, at face value, Miss Lonelyhearts fails at ethics – his is a cataclysmic failure.  
However, this failure is of a far different order than the ethical failure of the world in which he 
lives.  Miss Lonelyhearts fails for sure, but it is a significant failure.  What his failure and death 
scene reveal is the inability to ever fulfill one‟s ethical duties and obligations.  Within Westian 
and Levinasian ethics, obligation is infinite, and, therefore, insatiable.  The revelation that Miss 
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical struggle is completely overwhelming and utterly fraught with hysteria 
implicates him within a drama of traumatism that indicates the absolute power and force of 
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obligation.  A significant failure, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical inadequacy points towards a 
traumatic conceptualization of ethical experience.  For West and Levinas, it is the moments when 
trauma most burdens, when we are the most traumatized due to our failures and inadequacies, 
that the way becomes illuminated. 
 
Though ethical frustration seems unavoidable in the novel (and, indeed, it is), nevertheless, West 
locates the possibility of ethical experience within the moment of writer‟s block.  It is precisely 
when Miss Lonelyhearts doesn‟t know what to do, doesn‟t know how to respond to the other, the 
times when he is most traumatized, that instantiates the ethical moment.  Within these moments 
of writer‟s block, brief as they may be, Miss Lonelyhearts experiences the asymmetry of ethical 
responsibility – that is, he recognizes the apogee of the other who occupies the transcendent 
space that commands the self forward.  Metaphysical desire manifests itself during writer‟s 
block, cognitive gaps revealing the I‟s freedom and spontaneity as essentially bound with the 
other.  What is revealed is the absence of any code of ethical action available for the self to 
appropriate.  As such, writer‟s block, for both Miss Lonelyhearts and West, is the debarment and 
overcoming of rhetorical-publicity and insincere response.  As Levinas claims, this overcoming 
of rhetoric brings us to justice, which consists in the mastery of the other: 
Justice consists in recognizing in the Other my master….  Justice is the 
recognition of his privilege qua Other and his mastery, is access to the Other 
outside of rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and exploitation.  And in this sense 
justice coincides with the overcoming of rhetoric. (TI 72) 
During the ethical moment of writer‟s block, then, Miss Lonelyhearts refuses to exploit the other 
by reducing her to a rhetorical formulation; his moment of cognitive and linguistic breakdown 
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reveals itself as saying though he does not have to even speak a word.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ very 
vulnerability and exposure unveil themselves before the presence of the other, and thus, he 
signifies his responsibility.  For Levinas, this exposure of the self in saying “is thus exposing of 
the exposure, saying, saying that does not say a word, that signifies, that, as responsibility, is 
signification itself, the-one-for-the-other” (OB 151).  According to both Levinas and West, ethics 
and communication are dangerous games, involving uncertainty and sacrifice – a giving-over of 





















To site ethics as traumatism and supererogatory giving, as West and Levinas do, presents some 
significant challenges, however, to notions of ethical responsibility and moral action.  
Admittedly, it is not difficult to construe either author as potentially ethically bankrupt and 
irresponsible.  Indeed, their own words lend themselves quite well to this criticism.  “In saying 
suffering signifies in the form of giving,” argues Levinas, “even if the price of signification is 
that the subject run the risk of suffering without reason.  If the subject did not run this risk, pain 
would lose its very painfulness” (OB 50).  Furthermore, Levinas claims that the I is responsible 
even for the persecuting perpetrated by the other.  To this effect, then, he equates ethical 
responsibility with a maternity: 
In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of 
substitution for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution and from 
the persecuting itself in which the persecutor sinks.  Maternity, which is bearing 
par excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor. 
(75) 
Not only do the other‟s claims persecute the self, but the self is also responsible for the 
persecution committed by others.  West, similarly, also runs the risk of sinking into 
irresponsibility.  Miss Lonelyhearts‟ willingness to endure the other‟s suffering risks a 
masochistic pleasure that is not a taking-responsibility, but is, instead, an indulgence in self: “He 
read it [the letter] for the same reason that an animal tears at a wounded foot: to hurt the pain.”   
 In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler has pointed out 
what may be the masochistic currency present in Levinas‟s thought.  Calling attention to 
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Derrida‟s claim that attempting to “respond to every Other can only result in a situation of 
radical irresponsibility,” she continues by asking, 
[I]s it really possible to sidestep self-preservation in the way that Levinas implies?  
Spinoza writes in The Ethics that the desire to live the right life requires the desire 
to live, to persist in one‟s own being, suggesting that ethics must always marshal 
some life drives, even if, as a super-egoic state, ethics threatens to become a pure 
culture of the death drive.  It is possible, even easy, to read Levinas as an elevated 
masochist. (140) 
Much like Nietzsche, Butler asks, essentially, does sacrifice and altruism even make sense apart 
from a drive towards egoistic pleasure?  Continuing this critique of Levinas, Critchley speculates 
about the implications of such an ethical project for the subject: 
Might one not wonder whether Levinas‟s ethics condemn us to a lifetime of 
trauma and lacerating guilt that cannot – and, moreover, should not – be worked 
through?  Doesn‟t Levinas leave us in a situation of sheer ethical overload where I 
must be responsible even for my persecutor, and where the more that I am just the 
more I am guilty?  If so, then such a position risks amounting to nothing less than 
a rather long philosophical suicide note or at the very least an invitation to some 
fairly brutal moral masochism. (67-68) 
As Critchley aptly identifies, in Levinas, once we have done the “right” thing (justice), we 
already owe exponentially more – that is, we are more guilty the more just we are.  We can never 
do the “right” thing because the “right” thing does not manifest itself in Levinas‟s ethics, and, 
therefore, we can never bring ethics to closure. 
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 If indeed Levinas‟s ethics, as well as West‟s for that matter, do not permit the possibility 
of a systematic code of moral action, then how, we might ask, can we ever realize our duty unto 
the other and act responsibly?  How may we ever do the right thing?  According to both Levinas 
and West, ethical experience does not give us a guide for moral conduct and action; rather, every 
ethical experience is vastly and immensely unique.  In this sense, then, it is exactly within the 
experience of our inadequacies – even our irresponsibility – which we come to an encounter with 
ethics.  For Levinas, ethics resides within the very incommensurability of human calculation 
with the Infinite; infinity debars the possibility of demystifying ethical experience through 
systematic normativity.  Similarly, for West, the experience of ethics – the experience of writer‟s 
block – refuses the prospect of subjective delimitation upon the other.  I cannot universalize the 
ethical relationship, the dyadic relation, through resort to a triadic normativity that seeks to 
uproot ethical experience by confining it to structures of codified response and action. 
 Additionally, we may wonder why, if ethics is nothing but sheer, brutal suffering and 
encounter, we should even act ethically at all.  If ethics is the experience of a pain that is 
unbearable, then why would anyone be motivated to act ethically?  Furthermore, and perhaps 
most importantly, if ethical experience presents suffering as insatiable and incapable of 
mitigation, then why act morally in the first place?  Morality, after all, must yield some rewards.  
Why should we confine ourselves to walking upon an ethical treadmill, so to speak?   
 I think both West and Levinas are acutely aware of these criticisms (they perhaps even 
share these views), which is why both ask, basically, if we are not duped by morality.  Does it 
even make sense to talk about ethics?  During another of her “therapy” sessions with Miss 
Lonelyhearts, Betty suggests that it is his job which is affecting his physical health and brusque 
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behavior (ironically, she is right).  Leave the job, according to Betty, and Miss Lonelyhearts‟ 
troubles will leave him.  However, as Miss Lonelyhearts claims, the job can never leave him: 
“You don‟t understand, Betty, I can‟t quit.  And even if I were to quit, it 
wouldn‟t make any difference.  I wouldn‟t be able to forget the letters, no matter 
what I did.” 
“Maybe I don‟t understand,” she said, “but I think you‟re making a fool of 
yourself.” 
“Perhaps I can make you understand.  Let‟s start from the beginning.  A 
man is hired to give advice to the readers of a newspaper.  The job is a circulation 
stunt and the whole staff considers it a joke.  He welcomes the job, for it might 
lead to a gossip column, and anyway he‟s tired of being a leg man.  He too 
considers the job a joke, but after several months at it, the joke begins to escape 
him.  He sees that the majority of the letters are profoundly humble pleas for 
moral and spiritual advice, that they are inarticulate expressions of genuine 
suffering.  He also discovers that his correspondents take him seriously.  For the 
first time in his life, he is forced to examine the values by which he lives.  This 
examination shows him that he is the victim of the joke and not its perpetrator.” 
(94, emphasis mine) 
Miss Lonelyhearts is not quite the delusional dummy readers often make him out to be.  He is 
aware of the extent to which his ethical project may just be a meaningless game in which he is 
participating.  However, ethical value does not come in asking what the significance of ethics 
and suffering is; rather, this value comes in the experience of the other in his transcendence.  
According to Steven Hendley in From Communicative Action to the Face of the Other: Levinas 
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and Habermas on Language, Obligation, and Community, “[I]t is the other person‟s 
unconditional importance to us that gives us a reason to be moral, a reason to suppose we are not 
duped by morality when we give the other…consideration not strictly entailed by the intelligent 
pursuit of our self-interest.”  He continues by stating,  
Insofar as we are communicatively bound to one another as interlocutors, we find 
ourselves called to an unconditional sense of our importance to each other, a sense 
of moral solidarity with each other that is knit into the very fabric of human 
intercourse with one another….  The “height” or moral authority of the other 
person only “comes to pass” in my relationship to the other, as I attempt to 
articulate the sense of unconditional importance of the other to which I find 
myself called in my communicative proximity to the other. (166-67) 
We might say, simply put, that ethics is in the experience of the other before whom we attempt to 
reveal ourselves.  We need not, then, speculate what the significance is of either moral action or 
of the other in-themselves, respectively – at this point, we are already separated from ethical 
experience, we are “duped by morality.”  Rather, we locate ethical value within the experience of 
moral action itself, when talking about ethics simply doesn‟t make any sense whatsoever.  And 
this, as I suggest, is what Westian writer‟s block and Levinasian traumatism contribute to the 
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